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Introduction 
 
Ever since the exploitation of its oil Venezuela had not been able to live without this black gold. 
Throughout its history the country had a love/hate relationship with oil. It helped and ruined its 
economy and politics several times. Oil revenues created a high income for the state, but at the 
same time traditional economic sectors eroded. There was barely any diversification of the 
economy, which made Venezuela highly depending on the international oil market and its prices. 
Oil gave the leaders of the country an enormous amount of power and Venezuela established a 
prominent position within the global world order. 
  The general academic debate regarding Venezuela’s international politics and oil 
abundance during the administration of Hugo Chávez is a prominent one in scholarly research 
which is focusing on the Latin American region. It is discussed from a rich variety of angles. Oil 
wealth and chavismo are inevitable topics when analyzing Chávez’s foreign policy. However, 
recent years there had been a limited amount of attention specifically centralized around these 
topics using contemporary frameworks of International Political Economy (IPE). Furthermore, 
there had been considerable attention in academia for Venezuela’s failures on a political and 
economic level during Hugo Chávez’s administration, but there had been limited space for its 
success. Therefore, more attention for this topics is needed in order to update the existing 
academic literature of Latin American Studies. 
  This thesis has as its main objective answering the question: what is the effect of oil 
abundance and chavismo in Venezuela’s foreign policy during the administration of Hugo 
Chávez? The three dominant concepts which will be discussed are oil abundance, chavismo and 
foreign policy. Oil abundance is important in Venezuela’s contemporary history, because it is the 
main force behind the Venezuelan economy and its politics. There is hardly any topic regarding 
Venezuela which can be discussed without oil abundance. Chavismo is the ideological discourse 
of populist politics dominating the Hugo Chávez administration. Chávez applied this discourse 
throughout both his domestic and international policies. The international relations of 
Venezuela will be the focus point for this thesis. Throughout the years it had been dominated by 
the influence of foreign oil companies benefiting from Venezuelan oil. However, the Venezuelan 
foreign policy in relation to oil abundance and chavismo can only be understood when analyzing 
the Venezuelan domestic politics as well. Therefore, these three concepts will be analyzed on 
three levels: domestic, regional and international. This will be done in the light of Robert Cox’s 
method containing the three factors material capabilities, ideas and institutionalization as a focus 
point. 
  In the first chapter the general debate on oil abundance, populist politics and 
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international relations will be analyzed. It will examine how petro-states are embedding oil 
wealth in their foreign policy as a diplomatic tool to strategically influence their international 
relations. Several petro-states will be discussed in order to discover certain prominent trends in 
the debate. These trends will tell more about the impact and value of foreign policies of petro-
states. It will be demonstrated that scholars have different opinions on how these foreign 
policies are serving their goals, or indirectly serving other agendas. From this angle the case of 
Venezuela as a petro-state will be further analyzed. 
  The second chapter provides a historic overview of the Venezuelan history right before 
the discovery of oil until the Chávez administration. It starts with the liberation of the 
Venezuelan territory from Spanish rule. One of the mayor freedom fighters of the Venezuelan 
territory was Simón Bolívar. He plays an important role in Chávez’s ideas resonating in 
chavismo. Furthermore, the start of several dictatorships will be discussed, the influence of 
foreign oil companies in Venezuela, the diplomatic relationship the with US and the years which 
were dominate by the rule of Pacto de Punto Fijo. The aim of the chapter is to demonstrate the 
roots of chavismo and provide a historical perspective of the Venezuelan oil era in the light of its 
foreign policy. It will be the bedrock for the third chapter were the contemporary connection 
between oil abundance, chavismo and the Venezuelan foreign policy will be analyzed. 
  The third chapter analyses the case leading towards an answer to the question what the 
effect of oil abundance and chavismo is on Venezuela’s foreign policy during the administration 
of Hugo Chávez. This will first be done by analyzing certain inducements and constraints of the 
Venezuelan domestic policy, in order to better understand the Venezuelan foreign policy in the 
second part of this chapter. The Venezuelan foreign policy can be divided in two parts. The 
regional policy and the policies outside the Latin American Region. Chávez’s foreign policy could 
be seen as an international version of chavismo spreading an anti-US hegemony discourse. 
  Several scholars had critique on petro-states in general, and on Venezuela in particular. 
The resource curse resonates this critique and the maladies resulting from the oil policies. This 
thesis will not argue that the policies during the Hugo Chávez administration had been a disaster 
on an international level. Chávez did not always follow the rules regarding polite diplomatic 
communication, nor did he always kept all parties satisfied. At a first glance this might seemed 
unthoughtful. However, when further analyzing his strategy it becomes clear Chávez carefully 
selected his enemies and friends to maintain chavismo throughout his foreign policy. 
Hypothetically, this detailed analysis will demonstrate that Hugo Chavez’s foreign policy was not 
always that unsuccessful on a diplomatic level as some scholars argue despite his sometimes 
outrageous statements towards his opponents and odd actions. 
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Chapter 1 
Different thoughts on oil abundance in relation to populism and foreign policy 
 
Oil had been a trading commodity ever since human existence. In the early days it was already 
used in the construction of walls and towers. In modern history oil industries began to develop 
in the early nineteenth century. Mankind discovered oil could be used for lamps, machinery, as 
gasoline and in chemical products. As the industrialization process continued, the popularity of 
these ways of using oil increased. Soon the world did not function without oil and it became one 
of the most important export commodities. Several states discovered an abundance of fossil fuel 
in their territories. The oil market and industries grew in a short period of time, but not without 
economic and political risks (Markus, 2015: 112-130). 
 Not long after the discovery of the new purposes for this commodity the world began to 
get acquainted with the economic and political opportunities and challenges of oil abundance. 
The demand for oil was growing so rapidly that states who owned large amounts of oil now 
could live as rentiers. Such states can be called rentier states. Hazem Al Beblawi and Giacomo 
Luciani suggest four characteristics of a rentier state: the rent situations predominate, the 
economy relies on a substantial external rent – and therefore does not require a strong domestic 
productive sector, only a small proportion of the working population is actually involved in the 
generation of the rent, and the state’s government is the principal recipient of the external rent 
(Al Beblawi & Lucinani, 1990). The term rentier state had been used ever since the twentieth 
century. Income received from an abundance of natural resource export does not necessarily has 
to come from oil. It can also be received by the export of other natural resources such as 
minerals, heavy metals and fossil fuels. In this case study, the focus will be merely on oil. 
  Not only became oil important for the world economy, but also for its politics. Since the 
rise of oil industries worldwide, petroleum politics have been an important aspect of diplomacy. 
The competition between oil rich countries grew and so did their position in the world order. Oil 
became an influential tool for rentier states to exercise power. Rentier states who generate their 
income from oil revenues and who use petroleum politics as a diplomatic instrument are called 
petro-states. 
  A phenomenon closely linked to heavy dependence on oil revenues is the resource curse. 
Scholars who extensively studied the resource curse concept are for example Michael Ross, 
Steffen Hertog and Hussein Mahdavy, among many others. The resource curse refers to the 
failure of many resource-rich countries to benefit fully from their natural resource wealth, and 
for governments in these countries to respond effectively to public welfare needs (Natural 
Resource Governance Institute, 1). Often it is also referred to as the paradox of plenty, because 
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one would expect resource-rich countries have better development outcomes, but the paradox is 
they generally do not (Karl, 1997; Collier, 2007). The adverse effect is that resource-rich 
countries tend to have higher rates of conflict and authoritarianism, and lower rates of economic 
stability and growth, compared to their non-resource-rich countries (Natural Resource 
Governance Institute, 1). Therefore having an abundance of natural resource wealth can be 
called a ‘curse’ (Collier, 2007: 39). When a natural resource is used well, it can create stability 
and wealth. When used poorly it can cause conflict and discontent. Especially states who depend 
for a large part of their income on one natural resource, like oil in this case, can suffer from the 
abundance of oil, because they do not have a diversified economy. 
  This chapter will analyse the different International Political Economy (IPE) perspectives 
on oil abundance, populism and foreign policy. Special attention will be given to the resource 
curse. It will examine what large amounts of this resource can do with the economy and politics 
of a petro-state. Closing with an explanation of the theory and methodology for this thesis. 
 
1.1 The academic debate around natural resource abundance leading towards the 
resource curse debate 
The academic debate regarding the international political economy of the resource curse is a 
broad and ongoing contemporary one. The idea that resources might be more of an economic 
curse than a blessing emerged in debates in the 1950s and 1960s about the economic problems 
of low and middle-income countries (Ross, 1999: 297-322). This debate was initially dominated 
by development economists, such Jacob Viner, Arthur William Lewis and Joseph John Spengler, 
and later by Raúl Prebisch and Hans W. Singer, who focus on the economic aspects of 
development processes in low-income countries and economic structuralists, like Andre Gunder 
Frank, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, who deal with inequality and distorted 
development.  
Foreign direct investment in resource rich states 
Firstly, within the debate among development economists, such as Jacob Viner and Arthur W. 
Lewis, in the 1950s a prominent thought was that third world countries with an abundance of 
resources would be protected against economic pitfalls, attract foreign direct investment and 
provide public goods (Viner, 1952; Lewis, 1955; Spengler, 1960). Initially, this can be a logic 
explanation for having an abundance of natural resources with a high export revenue, because 
as soon as a state starts to benefit from such commodities, this income can support social 
spending and the development of the state. Domestically this can solve problems a country has, 
and therefore internationally it can have a better economic position on the world market. Soon a 
counter response on these arguments followed by a minority of structuralist scholars. Raúl 
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Prebisch and Hans W. Singer argued in 1950 that primary commodity exporters would suffer 
from a decline in the terms of trade, which would widen the gap between the rich industrialized 
states and the poor resource-exporting states (Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950). Their argument 
was not received with open arms by the development economist. On the contrary, Viner 
disapproved their ideas by calling them "mischievous fantasies” (Viner, 1952: 61-62). However, 
the argument of Prebisch and Singer comes closer to ideas regarding the resource curse in the 
1990s, because they emphasise the negative effects of resource abundance. These scholars make 
a distinction between ‘the rich industrialized states’ and the ‘poor resource-exporting states’ 
(Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950). By indicating a gap between these states, they take a closer look 
at the global position of these states regarding knowledge and development. Most of the ‘poor 
resource-exporting states’ are development countries, who at the time of the discovery of the 
resource had not enough domestic knowledge and technologies for the exploitation of the 
natural resources (Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950). In the case of oil for example, foreign 
companies from the ‘rich industrialized states’ were consulted by the ‘poor resource-exporting 
states’ for oil   exploitation. The price these resource rich states paid was the domination in the 
oil sector by foreign multinationals, under the mask of foreign direct investment. Companies like 
Royal Dutch Shell and Standard Oil from the United States dominated oil fields abroad for a long 
time in several petro-states such as Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and also Venezuela. It were not the 
resource rich states themselves benefitting most from their natural resource abundance, but 
often western industrialized states. The ‘poor resource-exporting states’ became poorer, and the 
‘rich industrialized states’ became richer, widening the gap between these states. This is why 
Prebisch and Singer argue the resource rich states came to depend on the industrialized states 
(Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950). Their ideas evolved later in the dependency approach. This 
dependency of ‘recourse rich states’ on ‘industrialized states’ is important to take into account 
when analysing resource abundance on a level of the international political economy, because it 
indicates the position of the resource rich states in the world order. 
  Since the 1950s, economists have made a sustained effort to test these arguments, 
particularly the claims that developing states faced a decline in their terms of trade and are 
harmed by export instability (Ross, 1999: 302). Export instability is an important factor within 
the resource abundance debate. The international market for most natural resources, in 
particular oil in this case, is an unstable and unpredictable market. Prices are never fixed, 
causing price shocks and price volatility. Therefore the income of a petro-state can fluctuate. At 
times the income can be high when the price of oil on the international oil market is high, and at 
times of crisis the price of oil can be low, thus the oil revenues will be low. Especially for petro-
states the fluctuating oil prices can be problematic, because of their heavy dependence on oil 
revenues their income is never certain, which can cause shortage and thus domestic discontent. 
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Liberal and radical structuralists largely agreed on the problems of resource exports, but they 
split over how to rectify them (Ross, 1999: 302). Moderate structuralists like Hirschman 
favoured a strong role for the state to buffer developing economies against international price 
shocks, to capture the economic rents that were repatriated by multinationals and to invest 
them in other sectors of the economy (Hirschman, 1958: 60). Hirschman indicates the 
prominent role which foreign multinationals had in resource rich countries. In other words, 
domination of these foreign companies needed to be weakened to let the resource rich countries 
benefit from their own resources, so it would stimulate growth. In addition, the ‘buffer’ to 
economically protect a petro-state mentioned by Hirschman could come in different shapes. One 
of it are sovereign wealth funds, in which resource rich countries save their revenues for times 
when the oil price is low to protect them from the price shock and provide a temporary income 
from the savings (Carson & Litmann, 2009: 5). The other buffer would be an international 
organisation which controls the oil prices. From these structuralist ideas evolved the foundation 
of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960. An organisation which 
today still has as a main objective to “coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its member 
countries and ensure the stabilization of oil production, in order to secure an efficient, economic 
and regular supply of petroleum to consumers, a steady income to producers, and a fair return 
on capital for those investing in the petroleum industry” (OPEC, 2017).  In other words, it aims 
to create economic and political stability for oil exporters and consumers. According to 
Hirschman these types of buffers are essential for petro-states to leave the rents, who initially 
were taken by foreign multinationals, in the resource rich country, so they could develop and 
strengthen their economy (Hirschman, 1958: 60). However, this unification also creates power 
among the petro-states members of the organization. Furthermore, not all oil producing 
countries are represented in OPEC. Large oil exporting countries, such as Russia, Mexico and 
China, never joined the organisation. In the meantime other oil exporting organisations were 
founded such as Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries.  Therefore it remains 
difficult to keep the production stable. The fact that not all oil exporting countries are member of 
the OPEC also indicates a level of inequality even among petro-states. Some benefit from the 
unification of the organisation, some do not. 
  Inequality is a concept the dependency approach focusses on, because some states come 
to depend on other states which fosters the gap between them and increases inequality. 
The dependency approach 
Radical structuralist such as Andre Gunder Frank, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto 
formulated new interpretations about Latin American underdevelopment today known as the 
dependency approach, which emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. This approach states that natural 
resources flow from a periphery of poor and underdeveloped states to a core of wealthy states, 
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enriching the latter at the expense of the former, with a central contention that poor states are 
impoverished and rich ones enriched by the way poor states are integrated into the world 
system (Frank, 1966: 28-30). Andre Gunder Frank elaborated the ideas of Prebisch and Singer 
discussed earlier. Prebisch and Singer distinguish ‘the rich industrialized states’ and the ‘poor 
resource-exporting states’ and indicate a gap between these two (Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950), 
Frank takes this to a next level by seeing the ‘the rich industrialized states’ as a core of wealthy 
states, surrounded by the ‘poor resource-exporting states’ who are the periphery of poor and 
underdeveloped states (Frank, 1966: 28-30). Not only the gap between these states seems to be 
widening according to Frank, but because of how they are integrated into the world order, this 
inequality seems to be fostered (Frank, 1966: 28-30). This is how the core of wealthy states 
seems to benefit from the resource rich periphery of poor and underdeveloped states. Such 
different perspectives on the division between these states and the gap this causes is important 
to take into account when analysing oil abundance. The challenges petro-states face is not only 
caused by the discovery of oil or pre-existing circumstances, but it is also caused by this gap 
between states in the world order. It indicates the position of the resource rich states in the 
world order. 
  The radical structuralists Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto argued that 
capitalist governments in developing states would be unable to take the measures proposed by 
moderates as long as these governments were dominated by local elites who shared the class 
interests of the foreign multinationals (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: 83-86). These arguments 
indicate inequality in a socialist or slightly Marxist manner, because they criticize capitalism and 
are in favour of the developing states. Cardoso and Faletto focus on the state as a political 
institution. They indicate the domination of the government by local elites in resource rich 
countries. Often these local elites are in favour of other capitalist governments in the 
industrialized countries of which the foreign multinationals dominate their resource 
exploitation. Local elites and foreign multinationals have a close beneficial relationship. Both 
keep each other wealthy. The local elites give permission to the multinationals for foreign direct 
investment and both parties get a share in wealth. In the debate regarding natural resource 
abundance this would mean the wealthy states would become wealthier by means of 
multinationals trading resources owned by the underdeveloped states of which only the top 
layer of society becomes richer. The problem is the largest part of society stays poor when this 
mechanism remains (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979: 83-86). 
  From these arguments can be derived that the resource curse debate was approached 
from a different angles in the 60s and 70s. In the 50s it was mainly economic and unilateral. Only 
few elements were taken into account when analysing oil abundance. Having a natural resource 
was not seen as a curse at all. It was mainly an opportunity for developing countries to let their 
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economy flourish (Viner, 1952; Lewis, 1955; Spengler, 1960). Around the same time in late 50s 
and 60s and after that time more factors were involved in the debate around oil abundance, such 
as the state, institutions, the world order and politics, under the name of capitalism and 
communism (Frank, 1966; Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950; Cardoso and Faletto, 1979). The debate 
around the resource curse is not only focussed on the economy, but it is a multi-angled debate 
where different disciplines, such as economics, politics and socialism emerge. 
 
1.2 The resource curse debate regarding populism and oil abundance from an 
international perspective 
The term ‘resource curse’ was used and interpreted for the first time in print by economic 
geographer Richard Auty in 1993 in Sustaining Development in the Mineral Economies: The 
Resource Curse Thesis. His work explains how countries rich in mineral resources were unable to 
use this wealth to boost their economies, and how these countries had lower economic growth 
in comparison to countries without an abundance of natural resources (Auty, 1993). Two years 
later, in 1995, Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner elaborated on Auty’s article by examining 
ninety-seven countries over a nineteen-year period to measure the impact of resource exports 
on GDP. It was one of the first influential studies with strong proof for the correlation between 
natural resource abundance and poor economic growth (Sachs and Warner, 1995). After the 
research of Sachs and Warner many studies on the resource curse followed which shaped the 
academic debate regarding the international political economy of the resource curse. 
  Within the debate different topics are discussed, such as the centralized role of the state, 
the oil market and its price volatility, nationalization of the oil industries, pre-existing inequality 
in petro-states, corruption in governments because of petro-dollars, levels of democracy and 
autocracy. Often these topics are intertwined when discussing oil abundance. 
Populism in the centralized role of the state 
Societal explanations for the resource curse focus on the central role of the state, in this case in 
oil rich countries. Scholars supporting the societal approach suggest that resource booms 
enhance the political leverage of non-state actors who favour growth-impeding policies (Salant 
1995, Varangis et. al 1995). In other words, resource booms strengthen political power of non-
state actors who favour policies which might threaten growth. This political power can stimulate 
populism in a country, because political power becomes more important then growth. Auty 
argues that especially in Latin America manufacturers and workers who enjoyed subsidies from 
the resource sector stopped their governments from dropping import-substituting 
industrialization policies, despite they became counterproductive (Auty, 1995). The 
manufacturers and workers should be welcoming import-substituting industrialization policies, 
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in order to not see the manufacturing sector be dominated, and finally erased, by the resource 
sector. Obviously they received enough financial support from the resource sector to reject it. 
The workers become influenced by a higher political power and co-optated, which is a for of 
populism. However, Sachs and Warner suggest that such trade barriers do not work (Sachs and 
Warner, 1995). Such policies would work when for example a manufacturing sector dominates 
the resource sectors, but this is hardly the case. Especially in petro-states, the resource sector 
dominates the export market. Therefore, the societal arguments alone are not the strongest in 
the resource curse debate in the 1990s. But they do explain the domination of the resource 
sector over the other sectors. The domination of the resource sector and the high revenues this 
generates can become so strong that it fosters populism. 
  Counter arguments on the societal explanations are state centred arguments which 
explain there are more factors causing the resource curse. There is only a weak correlation 
between exports and trade barriers, because resource induced-protectionism might account for 
only one-third of the resource curse (Sachs and Warner, 1995). Sachs and Warner their 
argument counters the arguments in the previous paragraph of Hirschman, about the 
protectionism of the petro-state. Obviously, such protectionism for foreign multinationals and 
price shocks is not enough to let a petro-state benefit from its resource revenues. Protectionism 
is often done by the state and became even stronger when petro-states decided to nationalize 
their oil industry. 
The nationalization of the oil industries 
During the 70s and 80s many oil companies were nationalized. For example oil companies were 
privately owned often by large foreign multinationals. These companies were not free from 
corruption, because large sums of the oil revenues went to the foreign multinational and not to 
the countries were the oil was exploited. In order to let the oil revenues not go to foreign states, 
but remain inside the country, state officials chose to let the oil industry become state owned 
enterprises. Scholars have different opinions on what happens with a state when oil companies 
are nationalized. Michael Ross for example suggests that oil only gained strong antidemocratic 
powers in the late 1970s after most oil-rich developing countries nationalized their oil 
industries, which gave political leaders far greater access to the rents (2012). In other words, 
according to Ross the nationalization of the oil industries in petro-states gave more access to 
rents for state officials, especially to determine on what those rents would be spend, and thus it 
gave more power to these political leaders and less power to the public. Now the power was not 
in the hands of foreign multinationals, but in the hands of politicians. This can foster populism in 
politics, because politicians have the power to use oil revenues for their own political agenda to 
buy loyalty from the public. It gives the chance for democracy to erode and autocracy to grow. 
  John Waterbury elaborated on the previous argument and analysed how maintenance of 
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political coalitions has damaged the productivity of developing country state owned enterprises. 
He takes Ross’s statement to another level involving corruption by arguing: ‘principal-agent 
problems have led to crippling inefficiencies, despite autonomy, boards staffed with bureaucrats 
and “politicos” can arbitrarily intervene in management, thanks to the centralized 
administrative power structures’ (Waterbury, 1993). In this case the nationalization of the oil 
industry has a negative effect and can lead to higher levels of corruption in the form of nepotism, 
patronage and co-optiation. It is likely that when the rents of an oil company fall into the hands 
of corrupt state officials their followers expect a share in return for loyalty, these people can be 
high state officials in favour of the regime or close relatives. To avoid discontent in society 
populism can grow and certain groups can become co-optated to keep them satisfied. With the 
nationalization of the oil industry in a petro-state, the state gets a more central and dominant 
role. Important to bear in mind is that in both cases, when an oil company is privately owned, as 
well as owned by the state, corruption can be maintained. The nationalization of an oil industry 
is not a guarantee for the elimination of corruption, and therefore an increase in oil revenues 
distributed to the people. Foreign multinationals as well leaders of the state can be corrupt.  
  In contrast to Waterbury, Steffen Hertog argues there is still hope for the state owned 
enterprises by keeping politically motivated distribution and profit-oriented economic planning 
separate, non populist regime elites can provide space for profit-oriented management (Hertog, 
2010: 293). Unfortunately this is rarely the case in petro-states, because in the state centralized 
regimes politically motivated distribution of rents and profit-orientated economic planning go 
hand in hand. Most of the regimes have high levels of populism to keep society satisfied. In 
addition, such populist regimes cope as well with government systems drowning in corruption 
which is hard to erase. 
Corruption in the petro state: nepotism, patronage and co-optation 
Corruption inside a petro-state can grow not only because of oil abundance. One of the first 
scholars who developed the resource curse concept into a theory was Hussein Mahdavy. He 
argued that high state officials receiving resource rents tend to become reluctant to take risks 
and do not invest in development of the country, they rather invest in maintaining the status quo 
(Mahdavy, 1970). Often this is the case in petro-states. However, when the regime practices 
populism they pretend to have development on the political agenda, but in reality they are 
investing in keeping their own political allies satisfied by nepotism and patronage. This 
clientelistic bond of allies surrounding state officials is part of the status quo. 
  Instead of focussing on the economic and political side only, Hootan Shambayati involves 
social actors and suggest that rentier states receive too little pressure from society to improve 
policies, because taxes are generally low in petro-states in order to keep people satisfied and 
discourage them from protesting (1994). Keeping society quiet is a form of co-optation imposed 
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by certain inducements and constraints. The inducements are that people do not have to pay 
taxes, but in exchange for that the constraints are that they are not allowed to protest or 
demonstrate their public opinion. 
  Both scholars give a different explanation to the resource curse problem and analyse 
different actors. Such arguments come closer to the approach of the resource curse, from the 
perspective of the international political economy, which is not focussed on the economy or 
politics only, but involves both, and includes social actors. Interesting about previous arguments 
is that one would expect resource rich countries to be economically stable, because of the 
revenues the exportation of a natural recourse can bring wealth, but the contrary seems to 
happen. In fact, it challenges the capabilities of the state and can weaken the institutions. 
  Terry Lynn Karl focusses on the weakness of the state and its institutions, and the 
capability to promote economic development. Such institutions might become weak, because of 
corruption. She claims that when a state highly depends on oil, it tends to gets a characteristic 
institutional setting called the petro-state: 
which encourages the political distribution of rents. Such a state is characterized by fiscal  
reliance on petrodollars, which expands state jurisdiction and weakens authority as 
other extractive capabilities wither. As a result, when faced with competing pressures, 
state officials become habituated to relying on the progressive substitution of public 
spending for statecraft, thereby further weakening state capacity (Karl, 1997: 16). 
Karl her argument is from the same nature as the arguments of Shambayati and Mahdavy. The 
three arguments are intertwined, because each bears a part of the other. They all take the state 
as a centralized institution, but shine a light on it from different perspectives. Mahdavy focusses 
on nepotism and patronage of state officials who use resource revenues for their own political 
game of empowerment, Shambayati involves co-optiation which further weakens state capital 
and causes instability, and Karl points out that this dependence on oil revenues causing political 
corruption weakness the development of the economy and the state capabilities. 
  If the governments of petro-states are generally so corrupt, Giacomo Luciani might have 
the solution to this problem. “The government should not have control over the oil revenue: it 
should receive an allocation from an institution representing a higher level of national 
consensus and enjoying greater stability” (Luciani, 2011: 227). Letting the government have less 
control over the oil revenues sounds like a good solution, especially in states with a lot of 
corruption. The politicians will not have the authority over the petro-dollars, and the spending 
will be more under control. But the question remains who will be responsible within this 
organisation and are there no strings attached to the government. It might create stability, but 
perhaps it will not take a long time before this institution also will be bribed. 
  Another way to create more economic and political stability are sovereign wealth funds. 
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These are investment funds owned by the state. The funds are common in resource rich 
countries. The state saves a part of the resource revenues in order to have a buffer for possible 
hard times in the future. This way of saving will protect a government depending highly on one 
commodity from price shocks and volatility. In addition, this money can be continuously spend 
on for example health and education. These important political actors do not have to suffer of 
the price volatility on the oil market. However, there are two major pitfalls to these saving 
systems: the lack of transparency and their possible misuse for political or other non-
commercial goals (Weiss, 2009: 1). In addition, this system functions well in authoritarian 
regimes, and less well in democracies. In an authoritarian regime the ruler of the state does not 
have a certain term. He can make long term goals by remaining in power. The revenues will be at 
his disposal and he does not have a term in which he has to fulfil his political promises and lose 
the money to his successor. In a democracy a ruler is only in power for several years. If one 
creates a sovereign wealth fund, the revenues invested will go to the successor, and it is 
unknown what happens to this investment. Therefore, a sovereign wealth fund is not always a 
promise for stability. 
  These forms of corruption discussed are the right ingredients for the resource curse to 
develop itself, unfortunately they are hard to eliminate and will affect sooner or later the levels 
of democracy and autocracy. 
Democracy and autocracy in petro-states 
Paul Collier analyses the development of democracy and autocracy in petro-states with high 
levels of inequality. Resource rents are likely to induce autocracy, but the biggest issues for 
autocracies is that replacing autocracy with democracy — not an easy thing to do, since 
autocrats generally cling tenaciously to power — is unlikely to be enough, because the sort of 
democracy that the resource-rich societies are likely to get is itself dysfunctional for economic 
development (Collier, 2007: 51). Thus, even when there is transition in an autocracy to 
democracy, of to higher levels of democracy, this kind of democracy is not working, because 
there is a lack of restraints. 
  Thad Dunning adds to Collier’s argument that pre-existing inequality is an important 
additional factor in petro-states to which the resource curse applies. Dunning argues that high 
pre-existing inequality settings he studied, like in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Botswana and 
Chile, the limited role for checks and balances and for protections of minority (elite) rights might 
ordinarily make democracy of this kind highly threatening to elites (2008: 290). First, he 
explains that because of unequal conditions in the economy and politics of a country before oil 
was discovered. One of these unstable conditions could be the level of democracy or autocracy 
and no restraints. Second, if a country has high levels of autocracy and low levels of democracy 
when oil is discovered often oil can bolster autocracy, when a country has low levels of 
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autocracy and high levels of democracy oil can bolster democracy. Third, in a country with high 
levels of autocracy, democracy can be a threat to a small group of elites, because society might 
demand equality and therefore and equal distribution of oil rents going to the people and not to 
the pockets of local elites. 
  Democracy and autocracy always come in certain levels. One state can me more 
democratic than the other. Regimes with both autocracy and democracy are called hybrid 
regimes. These are political systems in which the mechanism for determining access to state 
office combines both democratic and autocratic practices (Coralles & Penfold, 2011: 137-138). 
Javier Coralles and Michael Penfold analysed in particular the case of Venezuela, but argue that 
in the beginning of the 2000s there were many petro-states becoming hybrid regimes. In 
addition, they go beyond the traditional arguments of the resource curse, claiming that this 
curse alone is not enough to explain the direction in which these petro-states are heading. The 
explanation for the rise of hybrid regimes regime lies in what could be called an “institutional 
resource curse”: oil, certainly, but in combination with a number of institutional arrangements, 
is what explains key regime change (Coralles & Penfold, 2011: 6). In other words, they do agree 
with the previous arguments of scholars such as Karl, Shambayati, Mahdavy, Collier and 
Dunning. But, they draw the line further and claim that petro-states who are hybrid regimes are 
capable of developing not a regular resource curse, but an institutional resource curse. This 
argument bears all previous arguments, because in the institutional resource curse the state as 
an institution is twisted and shaped in favour of the state officials to remain in power and cause 
as less social discontent by taking control over the public, jurisdiction, enterprises and media. 
  To understand the political position of Venezuela in the global world order and 
unification between petro-states regarding their oil export it is important to briefly examine a 
few other dominant petro-states and their regimes.  
The position of petro-states in the global word order 
Outside the Latin American region the most leading petro-states can be found in the GCC (Gulf 
Cooperation Council) region. Mayor oil exporters in the region are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the 
United Arab Emirates. All three countries are OPEC member states. These are relatively young 
nations in comparison to Venezuela, since the region was ruled by the Ottoman Empire for 
decades and after that the region became British protectorate. All of these states have 
authoritarian regimes ruled by absolute monarchies since they were found. These states do not 
have populist regimes, but do use oil for their politics and foreign policy. Adam Hanieh argues 
that the power of the rulers in the GCC is effectively hereditary, concentrated in a family that 
controls the state apparatus and large tracts of the economy (2011: 9). Nepotism plays a role in 
these regimes where high positions are given to tribe or family members. Important to bear in 
mind is that neither these regimes are free from any form of corruption, nor from the 
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domination of society. Bernard Haykel is claiming oil will remain a tool used by the GCC states 
seeking to dominate society, but equally a topic through which dissent and resistance are 
produced from below (2015: 147). Also in this case oil is increasing political power just as in 
Venezuela, but this power is used in different ways, because the regimes and societies are 
structured in different ways as in the Latin American region, because of the autocratic rule of 
royal families. 
  Another OPEC member and ally of Venezuela is Iran. Iran gradually became closely 
aligned with the West and grew increasingly autocratic (Cordesman: 1999, 298). However, 
growing discontent among the people against western influences caused the revolution in 1979 
leading toward the Islamic Republic of Iran. These western influences might have inspired 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for his anti-US policy, just as Venezuela’s historical influence of the US 
had inspired Hugo Chávez. Iran has an autocratic regime in which the Supreme Leader of Iran 
makes the highest political and economic decisions. Just as previous states Iran used oil 
revenues to practice an autocratic regimes. 
  The countries mentioned above have several aspects in common which determine their 
global position. They are worldwide mayor oil exporters, are OPEC member states and have 
autocratic regimes. All are allies of Venezuela. 
  However, there is one country which is an exception within the global world order 
regarding its oil abundance and politics. Paul Collier agrees with Thad Dunning that Norway is 
this exception because it is a mayor oil exporting country which already contained high levels of 
democracy, equality and economic growth before in the 1960s the oil in Norway was discovered 
(2007: 51). Furthermore, Norway has a transparent sovereign wealth fund (Carson & Litmann, 
2009: 43). This pre-existing prosperity and a transparent sovereign wealth fund might help 
Norway to remain prosperous and stable. Norway had never been an OPEC member, it never 
had an autocratic regime and never had been an ally of Venezuela. This indicates most oil 
exporting countries and diplomatic allies of Venezuela are autocratic regimes. 
  In fact, it is still difficult to trace why exactly Norway is an exception within the resource 
curse debate, because, as Michael Ross states clearly: “The failure of states to take measures that 
could change resource abundance from a liability to an asset has become the most puzzling part 
of the resource curse” (1999). The next paragraph will discuss the method which will finally help 
getting closer to the source of this complex problem. 
 
1.3 The International Political Economy and Robert Cox’s Method 
The method for this thesis will be an IPE theory developed by Robert Cox. It is a theory in the 
shape of a triangle, connecting the three factors: material capabilities, ideas and 
institutionalization. The theory will be explained in this paragraph for a better understanding of 
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how it will be applied as a method to the case. Cox’s theory suits this thesis, because it is a theory 
which takes into account multiple-angles. It does not only focus on the economy or politics of 
international relations, but includes both variables and social factors. This will be needed, 
because the central focus will be Venezuela and its oil abundance. But this will be analyzed in 
relationship to chavismo, because that was the dominant populist ideology during the 
administration of Hugo Chávez, and its international affairs. It will demonstrate how they are 
connected and interact with each other. The theory analyses a case always within its historic 
context, which is important for a deeper understanding of the origins of a case. In addition, the 
case of oil abundance and chavismo in Venezuela in the international context had been analyzed 
by IPE scholars, but Robert Cox’s theory had not been used before for this purpose. Therefore it 
will contribute to the literature by offering a new perspective. Before explaining the theory, a 
brief description of the International Political Economy will be given, to demonstrate why IPE is 
important for this case study and in order to define the framework for this thesis. Followed by 
an explanation of the theory and how this will be applied to the case in the next chapters. 
Definition of The International Political Economy from Robert Cox’s perspective 
There is not a fixed consensus about the meaning of IPE. As the field evolved throughout years of 
research, different meanings of IPE evolved throughout its history. Robert O’Brien and Marc 
Williams argue that it is an open field of study that encompasses both the national and the 
international, an interdisciplinary endeavor that ‘crosses the boundaries between the study of 
politics and economics’, which may also draw on a range of other social science fields such as 
history and geography (2013: 24). In contracts, John Ravenhill argues IPE is a subject whose 
central focus is the interrelationship between public and private power in the allocation of 
scarce resources (Ravenhill, 2011, 19). His description belongs to the traditional form of IPE. 
This thesis will hold on to the broader perspective from Robert O’Brien and Marc Williams. The 
focus on the connection between the national and international factors, combining politics and 
economics, and adding other disciplines such as history, is appealing for this thesis, because it 
will need a complex approach taking into account more perspectives. 
  In the 70s, around the time of the first oil crisis, new scholarly perspectives and theories 
on economics and politics emerged (Broome, 2014, 5). In the 80s Robert Cox, together with 
several other IPE scholars, published his ideas. One of his most important arguments is that 
“theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (1996: 87). Cox means that previous 
theories often were developed for serving the purpose of political liberal hegemonic powers. 
Hegemony in the Gramscian tradition is “an order within a world economy with a dominant 
mode of production which penetrates into all countries, it links into other subordinate modes of 
production and is a complex of international social relationships, which connect the social 
classes of the different countries” (Gill, 1993: 61-62). Another reason for choosing this theory, is 
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because hegemony in the current and historical world order is an important concept for this 
case study. It is a dominant concept within chavismo and will be further enhanced in the 
following chapters. Cox tends to be critical about these existing hegemonic theories. Just as Cox 
was critical about hegemony, so was chavismo. Criticism on hegemony resonates throughout the 
IPE discussion in the 1980s. 
  Not all IPE scholars agree with such criticism. Especially the British school of IPE 
supports this argument. There are two different schools of IPE: the British and the American 
school. The American School focusses on international institutions, international regimes and 
governments (Cohen, 2008: 13). This is a rather singular perspective, because when analyzing a 
multi-angled case study there are more elements involved. The British School is more complex, 
because it goes beyond the state alone to encompass a much wider array of authoritative factors 
(Cohen, 2014: 13). This case study regarding Venezuela is not only about government relations 
and oil abundance, but also about the left wing ideology chavismo. It is a critical case study. 
Because of its complexity and approach from the British School, such as Robert Cox’s theory, 
would be most suitable for this analysis. 
The Method: Robert Cox’s Triangle 
In Cox’s Social forces, states and world orders: beyond international relations theory he describes 
a theory in which he follows the interaction between three forces: material capabilities, ideas 
and institutions (Cox, 1996: 98). Cox’s essay aims to explain a broadening of the enquiry beyond 
conventional international relations, so as to encompass basic processes at work in the 
development of social forces and forms of state, and in the structure of global political economy 
(Cox, 1996: 90-91). In other words, Cox’s work is critical about hegemonic international 
relations theories and questions them (Cox, 1996: 90-91). At the same time it adds other 
relevant structures to the existing theories. Material capabilities, ideas and institutions are 
connected through the shape of a triangle. The way in which the lines of forces run is always a 
historical question to be answered by the particular case study (Cox, 1996: 98). This study 
engages with the interaction of these forces and demonstrates how they interact in the case of 
Venezuela concerning its oil abundance and foreign affairs during the administration of Hugo 
Chavez. Important for this analysis is that each of the sets of forces, seen as a whole and 
separately, will be seen as containing, as well as bearing the impact of the other (Cox, 1997: 
101). Thus, each force is not a singular entity standing alone. They are intertwined and interact 
with each other, and inevitably carrying each other’s impact. In order to apply Cox’s theory on 
this case a brief explanation of each force will be given first. 
  The most dominant force of the triangle in this case will be the material capabilities, 
which are productive and destructive potentials (Cox, 1996: 98). On the one hand they are 
productive because they facilitate labor, capital and accumulate wealth (Cox, 1996: 98). On the 
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other hand they are destructive because they can destroy usual patterns, such as existing 
markets or traditional workforces (Cox, 1996: 98). A natural resource such as oil can be a 
material capability. In the case of Venezuela for example, oil had produced labor and 
accumulated wealth. Before the extraction of oil the state wasn’t a significant player within the 
global world order. When oil was discovered several major oil producers started to show 
interest in its oil exploitation. However, traditional means of trade such as agriculture and cocoa 
farming eroded because of trade in the newly exploited commodity. The oil exploitation caused 
an enormous demographic shift. Not since the wars of independence had Venezuela witnessed 
such a dramatic movement of people within its borders (Tinker Salas, 2009: 8). These people 
moved to new residential enclaves in de oil industry. This indicates that in the case of Venezuela 
oil had been a material capability being productive in terms of wealth and destructive in terms of 
traditional means of production. 
  The second force of Cox’s triangle is ideas. There are two types of ideas. The first one is 
intersubjective meanings, which are shared notions of the nature of social relations which tend 
to perpetuate habits and expectations of behavior (Cox, 1996: 98). An example in the case of 
Venezuela can be how Venezuelans act among each other in certain political situations. This is a 
less important form of ideas for this thesis, because the form of the idea will be analyzed is an 
ideology. The other form of ideas is the one of collective images of social order held by different 
groups of people (Cox, 1996: 99). In this context of the second form of ideas will be discussed, 
because it relates to the dominant ideology called chavismo. The focus of ideas will be on a 
collective political and economic level and less on the level of individual social interaction 
between the Venezuelan people. 
  The third force of Cox’s triangle is institutionalization. This force is a means of stabilizing 
and perpetuating a particular order (Cox, 1996: 99). Chávez tried to stabilize a particular 
national order in Venezuela. His government did this by taking control over the oil industry, the 
media, the legislation and several other institutions. By stabilizing this national order he could 
continue doing this on an international level where he had strengthen ties between Venezuela 
and other left wing-petro states. In the context of institutionalization the foreign affairs of 
Venezuela will be discussed. 
  Throughout this thesis the interaction between these forces will be analyzed in order to 
indicate different variables and trends within the academic debate regarding the political 
economy of petro-states and the case of Venezuela within this debate. 
  Robert Cox’s model is a socio-economic model and a heuristic device (Cox, 1996: 100). 
This means the method does not take into account one variable only, but uses a broader variety 
of variables. After extensive research it appeared that Robert Cox had not received critique on 
this specific essay. However, he had received general critiques from a scholars from the 
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American School of IPE with a realist economic background. Roger Tooze for example, 
contradicts the ideologist approach in IPE, and rather sees IPE from a realistic point of view with 
a pure economic model (1987, 527). His approach would be too singular for this thesis, because 
it will not only take Venezuela’s economy as a static entity into account, but it will also analyze 
the political effect of oil wealth and chavismo in Venezuela on an international level. John Adams 
is even less merciful in critiquing Cox. Adams’s opinion on his work is that it is a complete 
failure, because it is not original containing too much weak Marxism, it is categorizing too much, 
he is predicting the past and it is not ‘real’ economics (Adams, 1989, 224-225). John Adams is 
clearly a hard core right wing economist who does not appreciate Cox’s work. This thesis will 
argue that the right wing economist view of John Adams would not suit the analysis. The 
singular approach of Tooze and Adams is biased, because it is too singular. It is a narrow way of 
examining this broad world order we live in with all these different variables. Returning to Cox’s 
famous phrase: “theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (Cox, 1996: 87). Tooze and 
Adams are serving the right wing economic world order, without politics and social factors. Also 
their views may exist, but in addition to that, we need other critical views, such as Cox’s work, 
because there are more ways in which we can see the international political economy. Resulting 
in more critical answers about the current world order.  In contrast to Roger Tooze and John 
Adams, there are scholars who had followed Cox’s footsteps, such as Suzan Strange. 
  Some scholars from the British School of IPE had built on Cox’s model. A prominent 
scholar who did this was Suzan Strange. In her book States and Markets she describes the model 
she had developed. It has similarities with Cox’s triangle, but her work uses four concepts. The 
four structures she mentions are security, knowledge, finance and production (Strange, 1988: 
27). Her work corresponds heavily with Cox’s work, because both focus on one particular 
question which is: cui bono? (Cohen, 2008: 89). This means: who benefits? It is a frequently 
asked question in IPE. It will be one of the central questions for this research. In this thesis there 
will be analyzed how, and if, Venezuela is benefitting from its oil revenues. In addition, who 
benefits from the Venezuelan foreign relationships in the world order at the time Chávez was in 
power. 
The academic debate regarding the resource curse demonstrated this concept is approached 
from many different angles and constructed by a rich variety of opinions. The debate in the early 
50s and 60s was singular economic and static. In the 90s it evolved towards a more dynamic 
debate involving several disciplines such as economics, politics and (social) history. From this 
analysis can be derived that because of oil abundance a petro-state can face many challenges, 
which can become problematic. When oil is discovered in a petro-state, often the state does not 
have the knowledge and financial capability to extract and refine the oil. Foreign direct 
investment on these levels had often been needed in order to set up the oil industry. Oil 
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revenues ended up with large foreign multinationals, instead of the petro state itself. This caused 
discontent inside governments and many oil industries where nationalized. Despite the 
nationalization large sums of oil revenues did not end up with foreign multinationals, but it 
ended up in the pockets of high government officials. It was poorly spend on social and public 
purposes. Because of these events public discontent rose which often made petro-states more 
autocratic then democracy to maintain control over their civil society. Generally, this had been 
hurting most petro-states more than it was helping them. The next chapter will demonstrate 
how this development process regarding oil abundance, populism and foreign policy had been 
evolved during the history of Venezuela from the discovery of oil in the 20s, until the 90s when 
Hugo Chávez took office. The third chapter will answer the research question, as derived from 
Cox’s ‘who benefits?’. What is the effect of oil abundance on chavismo in Venezuela’s foreign 
policy during the administration of Hugo Chávez? There will be examined who was benefitting 
most from the oil in Venezuela: was it Hugo Chávez, was it the Venezuelan public, the state of 
foreign actors? In addition, was it bad for the regime of Hugo Chávez or not? Throughout all 
chapters the international political economy theory of Robert Cox will be used as a method to 
keep focusing on the IPE perspective, which will give a multi-angled outcome of the case. 
  In order to answer these questions. A deeper understanding of the history of oil 
abundance in Venezuela’s economy and politics is needed, and will be analyzed in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
 A historical perspective on oil abundance, foreing policy 
and the roots of chavismo 
In order to understand what is happening nowadays, we have to understand what happened in 
the past. As a result one can interpret events of a case not only in its contemporary time and 
space, but also in the historical context. This provides a more holistic outcome for this thesis. 
  This chapter will provide a historical perspective of oil abundance in Venezuela in the 
context of its international relations and oil policies on a politic and economic level to better 
understand the roots of chavismo in the next chapter. Important to bear in mind when analysing 
the history of this case is the IPE framework, and specifically for this case Robert Cox’s triangle 
of material capabilities, ideas and institutions as explain in the previous chapter. Not only there 
will be a focus on the economic history, as frequently done in the past, but also on the political 
and social aspects of its history. It will take several factors into account, such as on a political 
level the government, on an economic level the institutions such as the foreign oil companies, 
and on a social level the Venezuelan people. 
  The twentieth century will be marked as the main timeframe for the historical analysis.. 
Although the first oil wells were discovered in the eighteenth century, this thesis will not start 
with the initial discovery, because oil started to become an interesting export product for 
Venezuela in the late nineteenth century. Around this time a worldwide need for oil increased 
rapidity, because of the global industrial revolution. Oil started to become internationally an 
important trading commodity. This trend was important for Venezuela, because it discovered its 
territories contained significant oil wells and the country could export the oil. 
  Therefore, the analysis will start with the discovery of the first significant oil wells and 
its exploitation by foreign multinationals in the beginning of the twentieth century during the 
regime of Juan Vicente Gómez. Followed by the first Dutch disease and detachment from the 
foreign multinationals under the Pacto de Punto Fijo administration lead by Rómulo Betancourt. 
After that the way towards the nationalization of the Venezuelan oil industry will be discussed, 
together with the Venezuelan initiative of the formation of the OPEC. Finally, the dramatically 
dropping oil prices, discontent of the Venezuelan people and the path towards the presidency of 
Hugo Chávez will be analysed. 
  First, this chapter will start with an explanation of the political and economic situation 
before oil was discovered, to understand the transition towards the oil exploitation by Juan 
Vicente Gómez and the foreign oil companies, and later the deepest roots of chavismo. 
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2.1 Venezuela before the oil era: caudillismo and agriculture 
Until 1821 Venezuela had been a colony of the Spanish Empire. Political turmoil in Europe and 
Spain was one of the main causes for freedom fighters, such as Simón Bolívar and José de San 
Martín, to dissolve the South American continent from the Spanish Empire. The great liberator of 
Venezuela was Simón Bolívar. In a nutshell, he was a rebel, a revolutionary, and an anti-
monarchist (Chávez, 2009: 6-16). In The Jamaica Letter, a letter he wrote when he was in exile in 
Kingston, he expressed his loathing attitude towards the Spanish occupation: “our hatred for the 
Peninsula is vaster than the ocean which separates her from us” (Simón Bolívar: 2009, 42). In 
addition to break the ties with Spain, he also wished to create a united South America: “more 
than anyone, I wish to see the greatest nation in the world formed in America… Union is 
certainly what we need most in order to complete our regeneration” (Bolívar, 2009: 54, 62). 
Freedom from colonialism and unification were important to him because in his opinion it 
would create a free government, stop slavery and justice for all South American people (Bolívar, 
2009: 40-63). Bolívar succeeded in liberating most of South America, together with other 
freedom fighters and military governors. However, his dream to unify South America as one 
nation did not come true. The continent was scattered by too many different cultures and 
minorities. Many were already existing before the occupation of Spain and some emerged during 
the occupation. Bolívar’s ideas later became important principles for the ideology of Fidel Castro 
and Ernesto Che Guevara during the Cuban Revolution, and also for President Hugo Chávez. 
These events will be discussed later in this chapter. 
  The fight for independence from Spain in the territory what today is called Venezuela did 
not proceed without struggle. It lost close to 40 percent of its population, suffered enormous 
property damage, and saw almost all of its previous bureaucratic systems destroyed (Lombardi, 
1966: 153-168). After Venezuela’s liberation caudillismo dominated the way in which the 
country, and most of South America, was governed. In the nineteenth century caudillismo was 
characterized as an informal political-social system based on a paternalistic relationship 
between the subordinates and the leader, who obtained his position as a result of his forceful 
personality and charisma (Castro, 2007: 11). It was not a stable political system. On the contrary, 
it was a system dominated by instability, insecurity and violence.  
  Before Venezuela became an independent state the major sources of income were cacao 
beans, coffee beans, tobacco, sugar, cotton and other forms of agriculture, like most South 
American countries at that time (Arcila Farías, 1946: 69). Oil was not playing a significant role at 
that time. After the independence in 1830, the economy of Venezuela declined, because Spain 
had been the main importer of cacao. The demands of agricultural products from other new 
trading partners such as other parts of the Americas or Great Britain were not enough to cover 
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this loss. 
  In the first decades of Venezuela’s independence the country suffered economically and 
politically. It was dominated by dictatorial rule, knew several presidents in a short period of 
time, had civil wars and disputes over territories with Great Britain and The Netherlands 
resulting in a diplomatic crisis (Calcaño, 1895). Because of the political turmoil in the country, 
the economy could barely flourish. In other words, before oil started to play a significant role in 
Venezuela, the country already had known a turbulent history. 
 
2.2 Oil and dictatorship: the beginning of the oil era 
For centuries it was known that the land of Venezuela contained oil reserves. What was not 
known was how much oil it contained, because at that time measurement techniques were not 
available. Along with global industrialization in the nineteenth century the need for oil increased 
and techniques to explore oil fields improved. Juan Vicente Gómez became president in 1908 
and anticipated on the global trend of industrialization. He gave the order to foreign oil 
companies to explore, produce and refine oil (Brading, 2013: 44). The first oil wells were drilled 
around 1910. When on the 14th of December 1922 the oil well called Barroso no. 2 exploded 
Venezuela was destined to become a petro-state (Brading, 2013: 6). This event was a turning 
point in Venezuelan history. The explosion of the well was the proof the territory contained 
enormous reserves. Domestically the Venezuelan state did not have many experts on oil 
exploitation (Tugwell, 1975: 39). Therefore, such knowledge and expertise needed to come from 
abroad. Neither had it the financial means and technical instruments. This historical moment 
marked the start of the dependence on foreign multinationals. Internationally there were many 
oil companies who were interested in benefitting from the riches of Venezuela. These were 
mainly British, North American and Dutch oil companies, such as Royal Dutch Shell and 
Rockefeller’s Standard Oil. 
  Initially many foreign oil companies in the Latin American region were based in Mexico, 
because the Mexican oil industry was one of the first in the region to develop itself and started 
by the end on the 19th century. The development of the Mexican oil industry took place before 
the development of the Venezuelan oil industry. In the 1920s the foreign oil companies shifted 
their industries to Venezuela, because of the loss of Mexican oil competitiveness, a loss 
reinforced by revolutionary nationalism (Brown, 1985: 385). In Mexico between the 1910s and 
1920s the Mexican Revolution changed the country on a political and cultural level. However, 
the primary reason for the shift was economic, rather than political (Brown, 1985: 385). 
Venezuela under Gómez was cheaper to exploit and therefore more profitable for the oil 
companies. In addition, the Maracaibo region had the best potential in Latin America. This was a 
highly beneficial situation for Venezuela to expand their oil industry and production. 
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  Juan Vicente Gómez did not only had to take care of the oil industry, he also had the hard 
task to unite a fractured polity, because Venezuela was still polarized when he took power 
(Tinker Salas, 2009: 2). The unification under Gómez did not happen. On the contrary, he ruled 
the country as a dictator. His main focus was to increase oil production, keep his loyal 
supporters satisfied to remain in power and boost the Venezuelan economy. Corruption in the 
form of clientelism grew and he gave hand-outs to friends, family and his oligarchic alliance 
(McBeth, 2002: 214). Gómez preserved the existing wealth of a small group of elites who were 
now profiting from the oil bonanza. 
  The other group who was profiting from the oil revenues, were the international oil 
companies. They established their own oil policies and structures in Venezuela. Accepted by 
those in power as ‘Venezuelan enterprises’, the foreign oil companies gradually evolved their 
own separate power structure that created alternative sets of loyalties among their employees 
and other sectors of society’ (Tinker Salas, 2009: 3). Therefore, corruption did not only grew in 
the government, also the oil sector was permeated with corruption. Both sectors came to depend 
on each other. Gómez needed the oil companies to generate oil revenues for the Venezuelan 
economy to flourish and to remain in power. The oil companies needed Venezuela, because the 
Maracaibo region was on its way to becoming one of the most profitable regions for oil 
exploitation in the world. 
 Influence of foreign oil companies changed Venezuela on an economic, political and 
social level. Demographically there was an enormous movement of people towards the oil fields 
of Venezuela. Most of the oil reserves in Venezuela are until today located in the north-west of 
the country, around the Lake Maracaibo. The oil companies needed to settle here and recruited 
employees. Therefore, thousands of rural Venezuelans and their families moved from all over 
the country to the emerging oil towns that dotted the Lake Maracaibo area (Tinker Salas, 2009: 
6). The demographic change was significant. Not since the wars of independence had Venezuela 
witnessed such a dramatic movement of people within its borders (Tinker Salas, 2009: 8). These 
people were located in so called campos petroleros. These are housing and living camps for 
people working in the oil industry. 
Campos petroleros are structured and organised villages where the rules and regulations 
of the oil companies apply. Inside these towns there is a culture and organised life 
developed by the oil companies. There are strict rules for the employees regarding what 
they do and where they go. For example, only in the weekend Shell organises a bus trip 
to the city close by so the employees can leave the camp. Employees take such 
restrictions for granted, because they get paid well by the oil companies (Diplomatic visit 
SASREF, 29 November 2015). 
Such oil camps were a model for Venezuelan society and the world outside to demonstrate 
prosperity in Venezuela. For the government and the oil companies they were a tool to control 
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society by means of social engineering and maintain cultural hegemony. A form of labour 
aristocracy was created. 
  It is interesting to see how this labour aristocracy was reflected in a form of propaganda 
for Shell in Venezuela. The oil company published a magazine called Topicos Shell de Venezuela 
for its employees in the 1940s. The magazine was written in the Spanish language, thus the 
target audience were mainly local Venezuelan employees. Initially, this edition of the magazine 
focusses on the development of education in the oil camps of Shell. It emphasizes on how well 
developed the education is at the Shell oil camps, how important education is for the children of 
the employees and thus how important it is for the company. The editor writes: ‘The educational 
systems have been improved and are always advancing, and with this evolution teaching has 
become an important aspect of The Company’ (Topicos Shell de Venezuela, 1941: 1). Education 
is a carefully chosen topic by Shell. In this way it demonstrated affinity with the employees for 
which the well-being of their children is of great importance. It is a sensitive issue, because 
children are the future of each family. Additionally, there is a travel report of a journey to Great 
Britain as if the WOII is not taking place at all (Topicos Shell de Venezuela, 1941: 4-5) and a loyal 
employee who works for the company for 27 years gets rewarded with a golden watch calling it 
‘an act of justice’ (Topicos Shell de Venezuela, 1941: 8). The column Sociales draws the line even 
further by publishing private matters of the Shell employees. Such as the successful recovery of 
an employee after surgery, condolences of the loss of one of the family members of an employee, 
the birth of a baby, and the lunch which was offered by the workers to one of their staff 
members on the occasion of going out to enjoy their vacations (Topicos Shell de Venezuela, 
1941: 9). Shell was publishing compassionate messages and great successes of the company in 
Topicos Shell de Venezuela to demonstrate prosperity to their employees and Venezuela, in order 
to maintain and promote loyalty. This magazine was a proof of a well maintained form of labour 
aristocracy. Because of the collective working environment the employees started to organise 
themselves. 
  Oil workers and their unions became the most powerful component of the Venezuelan 
labour movement privileging the demands of the oil workers and their unions (Tinker Salas, 
2009: 11). Employees in other sectors did not enjoy such privileges. Thinker Salas describes the 
ethnic division of races in Venezuela because of the oil industry in his book: 
Between 1920 and 1940 the practices of foreign oil firms gave rise to a complex social  
and racial division of labour in which Dutch, British and United States citizens 
monopolized most managerial positions as well as drilling and other technical 
operations. West-Indians for the most part held clerical positions, while others occupied 
much-sought-after skilled jobs. Chinese consigned to relatively menial positions or 
sought new opportunities in local commerce. Venezuelans were relegated to the tenuous 
positions of day labourers (Tinker Salas, 2009: 139). 
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As demonstrated by this complex social and ethnic division of labour one can perceive that there 
were new social classes shaped in the already polarized Venezuelan society inside the oil 
industry. In addition, there was on the same grounds a division in salaries, housing and other 
benefits (Tinker Salas, 139). The foreign workers often dominated the Venezuelans creating new 
forms of political discontent in the social arena. 
  On top of the gap Gómez already had created, between a rich minority and a poor 
majority with his corruption policy, the oil companies were widening the gap in society between 
the people working in the oil industry and the people working in other sectors. By the 1960s 
upwards 25 percent of the Venezuelan population lived in or near an oil camp (Tinker Salas, 
2009: 4). The ethnic division in the Venezuelan society became enormous inside and outside the 
oil camps. It went from a polarized society to a shattered society. 
  Domestic discontent was rising. The shattered division in society and the crisis of the 
first Dutch disease around 1929 worsened the gap. Because of this extremely rapid increase in 
oil production and export, the other agricultural sectors of the Venezuelan economy were 
suffering. Venezuelans moved from working in the traditional sectors towards working in the oil 
sector. The government did not take enough measures to avoid the rapid decline of the 
importance of the agricultural sector, and therefore the extreme dependency on the oil sector 
increased (Lieuwen, 1954: 81). Inevitably, the majority of the population was not satisfied by 
these rapid changes. They did not enjoy the riches of the oil wealth, as such changes were not in 
their benefit. One of the first active signs of discontent occurred the year before the Dutch 
disease, in 1928. An organized group of students called Generación 28, united to protest against 
the government of Gómez. Some of the students who were active in this organisation later 
became prominent politicians. Among them were for example Rómulo Betancourt, former 
president of Venezuela, and Jóvito Villalba, founder of the Venezuelan political party Democratic 
Republican Union. Generación 28 was the first large project of reform in Venezuela and a 
demonstration for democracy (Brading, 2013: 44). The students did not succeed to politically 
reform Venezuela and some of them, such as Rómulo Betancourt, were exiled by Gómez. 
  Another form of written critique on the Gómez administration came from Rómulo 
Gallegos in the same year as the Generación 28 protests. The novel Doña Bárbara is about a 
woman who has the power to seduce and take control over men. The story is an allegory for the 
conflict between civilization and rural life in Venezuela Gallegos sensed among Venezuelans. 
Implicit in the criticisms of backwardness and lawlessness was praise for the populist rationale 
for change (Derham, 2010: 40-41). Gallegos his critique against the regime was not accepted by 
Gómez, therefore also he had to flee the country and went into exile in Spain where he published 
his book. Doña Barbara became a famous novel worldwide. For this work and other novels he 
was nominated in 1960 for the Nobel Prize in Literature (Nobel prize, 2018).  
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  Despite the critique of corruption and nepotism Juan Vicente Gómez received, he did 
improve Venezuela on a financial and logistic level. In the 1930s the national sentiment called 
‘sembrar el petroleo’ grew, it was a common believe that the oil revenues would be use to invest 
in modernization and growth (Thinker Salas, 2009: 12; Lieuwen, 1954: 83). This sentiment 
arose, because Gómez improved Venezuela’s economy, transportation network and invested in 
foreign relations and his successor maintained this trend. By 1930 Gómez had paid off the 
foreign debt, built up the country’s road network and manufactured a foreign press abroad 
(Betancourt, 1979: 39-44). 
  In the end. Goméz’s oil policy was beneficial for the Venezuelan economy and a small 
part of the population, but not for its politics and the quality of living for the majority of 
Venezuelans at that time. 
 
2.3 Oil and military rule: Venezuela becoming the world’s largest exporter of oil 
When in 1935 Juan Vicente Gómez died he was succeeded by his former Minister of War Eleazar 
López Contreras. The years after Gómez’s death were still dominated by authoritarian and 
military rule. However, in the 1940s during the regime of López Contreras and his successor 
Isaías Medina Angarita, Venezuela became the world’s largest exporter of oil (Bruce, 2008: 15). 
The increase in oil revenues occurred on the back of Lazaro Cardenas’s nationalisation of the 
Mexican industry in 1938 and the Second World War’s intensified demand for safe supplies 
(Bruce, 2008: 49). In particular the nationalization of the oil industry in Mexico was the start of a 
wave of nationalization processes in the region.  
 The regime of Eleazar López Contreras radically changed the oil policy. It was a more 
nuanced dictatorship. Oil laws became more beneficial for Venezuela, foreign oil companies had 
to pay more taxes and humanitarian situations in the oil camps improved (Lieuwen, 1954: 80-
83). In comparison to the administration of Juan Vicente Gómez this was an improvement for 
Venezuela. Even socialist or communist Venezuelans who were imprisoned or exiled by Gómez 
in the 1920s and 1930s were allowed to return to their country (Lieuwen, 1954: 72). Therefore, 
left wing Venezuelans had the chance to re-united and organise themselves once more. They saw 
an opportunity to take over power and make an end to the continuing stream of autocratic 
regimes, which were beneficial for the economy, but not for the public who had no voice in the 
economic and political choices made in Venezuela. By the end of the presidential term of López 
Contreras in 1941 his opposition remained critical. Agriculture was still prostrate, 
transportation facilities were lacking, little headway had been made in meeting the nation's 
great sanitation, housing, and educational problems remained (Lieuwen, 1954: 89). In other 
words, on a social level very little had improved. Worst of all, the nation was now more 
dependent upon oil than it had been under Gómez (Lieuwen, 1954: 89). His right wing 
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supporters would argue he improved the economy, but his left wing opposition would remain 
critical because he did little to improve Venezuela on a social level. The polarization and 
inequality continued to exist under his rule, and so it did when his successor took office. 
  Eleazar López Contreras was succeeded in 1941 by Isaías Medina Angarita. In the same 
year the Venezuelan oil industry experienced one of the worse shocks in history because of the 
attack on Pearl Harbor. This historical event brought war to the western hemisphere. Now also 
the Caribbean and Venezuelan oil were targets for Nazi tankers. The production in the oil 
industry declined, unemployment rose and revenues dropped. This was an economic disaster for 
Venezuela, because it was fully depending on the revenues of its oil production. In contrast to 
diversifying the economy, Medina Angarita decided to reform the oil law in order to let the 
country profit even more from the oil revenues (Lieuwen, 1954: 93). Meanwhile discontent was 
growing among an increasing opposition. The left wing opponents had enough of a shortsighted 
petroleum policy, restrictive labour controls, and resistance to social and political reform 
(Lieuwen, 1954: 100). After four year of presidency the regime of Isaías Medina Angarita was 
overthrown in 1945 by means of a military coup d'état led by Rómulo Betancourt and his 
followers of the political party Acción Democrática (AD). 
  Betancourt intended to establish a democratic regime in Venezuela. His term of three 
years was called ‘El Trienio Adeco’. In this term Venezuela held democratic elections for the first 
time in history and two new political parties, COPEI (Independent Electoral Committee) and 
URD (Democratic Republican Union), were formed (Arráiz Lucca: 2011, 2). These 
transformations indicate this term was characterized by a semi-democratic regime, there was 
more democracy then during the authoritarian regimes. However, this period started with a 
military insurrection, a junta was formed and it ended with another strictly military order 
(Arráiz Lucca: 2011, 2). 
  In 1947 Betancourt organised elections and Rómulo Gallegos was elected as president. 
His term did not lasted long enough to establish a democratic regime. Many Venezuelans, the oil 
companies and the military were not satisfied with the plans of AD. The political party intended 
to reform the oil policy, diversify the economy and raise taxes (Lieuwen, 1954, 11). These plans 
were not beneficial for the oil companies and a large part of the population working in the oil 
sector. Economically Venezuela had been flourishing during the dictatorships. The dictatorships 
were beneficial for the Venezuelan economy. 
  In addition, when Rómulo Betancourt was exiled in Costa Rica in the 1930s he had briefly 
sympathised with the Partido Comunista de Costa Rica (Betancourt, 2006: 152). Finally, he 
wrote in his memoires he came to the conclusion communism was not a system of organisation 
he wished to implement in Venezuela (Betancourt, 2006: 153). His brief sympathies for 
communism were not the main reason for the military to overthrow the AD administration, but 
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they could have seen this as an additional threat. 
  In 1948 Gallegos was overthrown by Carlos Delgado Chalbaud who was a military officer. 
Once more Venezuela had returned to an autocratic government ruled by a military junta. Again 
there was a strong focus on the development of the oil industry and very little on social 
programs or the diversification of the economy. This trend remained for the following years. In 
1952 Colonel Marcos Pérez Jiménez took office. During his term the oil prices were rising 
because the war against communism of the United States in Korea and Arab oil rich countries 
visited Venezuela (Tinker Salas, 2009: 218). In addition, Pérez Jiménez maintained cordial 
relationships with US government of President Eisenhower (Mähler, 2011: 594). Because of the 
war in Korea the Pérez Jiménez administration received more oil revenues from the United 
States and the diplomatic visited were important to establish a place on the international oil 
stage. The economic focus remained very much on oil production. Two years later there were 
some signs of diversification. In 1954 The Bethlehem Steel Corporation began to exploit its huge 
iron-ore deposits south of the Orinoco River, followed by the United States Steel Corporation 
(Lieuwen, 1954: 115). However, this was the exploitation of another natural resource and not 
enough to diversify the economy. Changes seemed far. 
 
2.4 Oil and democracy: Pacto de Punto Fijo and increasing US interference 
It was until the late 1950s that the political situation in Venezuela and Latin America changed 
radically. In the 1950s foreign companies began to withdraw from the social arena in Venezuela 
(Thinker Salas, 2009: 12). In the political arena there was unrest and discontent. Partly because 
there was a rising trend of communism in the South American region. In Venezuela signs of 
communism had been eliminated on the political stage. Betancourt came to the conclusion that 
communism was not the right political system for Venezuela, but in other countries in the region 
left wing regimes were gaining political support and power. For example, in Argentina Juan 
Peron started his second term, in Chile Salvador Allende tried to take over power and the Cuban 
Revolution was about to start. At the start of the Cold War the United States was afraid for an 
upcoming united communist Latin America which the Cuban Fidel Castro and his Argentinean 
companion Ernesto Che Guevara aimed to establish. Their ideology was not a new one, as 
freedom fighter Simón Bolívar, discussed the first paragraph, once had the same wish. It is a 
returning topic in Latin American history. A situation like this would threaten capitalism. 
Venezuela was a significant trading partner and supplier of oil to the United Stated. The 
capitalistic United States and its allies could not continue the war against communism without 
oil. Thus, Venezuela was of high importance for the United States on an economic and political 
level. The United States could not risk Venezuela becoming a communistic state. 
  After public riots against Pérez Jiménez in 1957 Rómulo Betancourt came to power again 
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by means of a coup d'état in 1958. This moment became a turning point in Venezuelan history, 
because it ended an era characterized by dictatorial rule, except from Betancourt and Acción 
Democrática’s earlier term from 1945 until 1948. AD together with two other prominent 
political parties established a new political order in Venezuela. It was an institutional 
arrangement of neoliberal political rule between two or more parties called a partidocracia 
(Mähler, 2011: 593). The AD established this arrangement together with COPEI (Social Christian 
Party) and Unión Republicana Democrática (URD), and called it Pacto de Punto Fijo. The main 
objectives of the pact were to combat the dictatorship, respect the constitution and electoral 
results, promote democracy, combat opposition forces seeking to undermine the pact and no 
single party hegemony (Corrales: 2001, 90). The pact intended to promote democracy. 
Paradoxically, by signing this pact between three dominant political parties, there was lacking a 
voice of other political parties and ideologies. The political pact was characterized by these three 
extremely strong political parties and other intermediate organizations, and by the intention of 
conflict avoidance and a high level of internal party discipline among the political elites (Monaldi 
et al. 2006, 35). It lasted for almost four decades. The new political system brought political 
stability to Venezuela, but was not free from corruption. Just as the dictatorial regimes it 
maintained powerful because of clientelism and patronage networks (Buxton: 2005, 334). In 
other words, it was beneficial for the stability in the country, but corruption and political 
inflexibility remained. Furthermore, there were forms of co-optation as well. For example in the 
agrarian sector, the three political parties gave hand-outs to the farmers. They did this in order 
to let them remain loyal and avoid a communist uprising. An agrarian reform was set in the 
1960s together with similar programs organised with the assistance of the United States all over 
Latin America (Enríquez, 2013: 617). Betancourt maintained cordial relationships with the 
United States under President J.F. Kennedy, just as his predecessor Pérez Jiménez under 
Eisenhower. 
  The programme US Alliance for Progress was launched by the United States in the 
beginning of the 1960s. The main aims of the programme were economic growth, price stability, 
income distribution, land reform, establishment or maintenance of democratic governments, 
elimination of illiteracy and social planning (Smith, 2009: 152). These outcomes of this US 
foreign policy strengthened the relationships and fostered trade between North and South 
America. The other purpose of this development programme was that the United States tried to 
dominate Latin America for the sake of capitalist hegemony. Kennedy actively implemented and 
promoted this programme in Latin America to avert revolutions in the region (Enríquez, 2013: 
617). Especially after the Cuban revolution this US foreign policy was actively maintained. In 
other words, the programme was economically beneficial for Venezuela, but it increased US 
influence and dependence in the region. 
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  Another important turning point in Venezuelan history was the formation of the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960. It was partly resulting from 
the growing international relations among other mayor oil exporting countries during the Pérez 
Jiménez regime and later during Betancourt administration. Venezuela was one of the 
promotors of OPEC and established the organisation together with Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The aim of OPEC was to control the oil production and regulate oil 
prices in the mayor oil exporting countries, governments of oil-producing and consuming 
countries agreed amongst themselves on quotas for production, which stabilised markets so that 
oil companies would no longer be deciding how much to sell their oil for and to whom (Markus, 
2015: 246). 
  Despite the formation of the oil cartel Venezuelan politicians started to get concerned 
about a restriction threat from the US and about the inroads that Middle Eastern oil was making 
into European markets (Thinker Salas, 2009: 227). They were concerned that these restrictions 
would interrupt Venezuelan trade. Europe was an important market for Venezuelan oil, but now 
the Arab oil exporting countries were gaining access to European markets, Venezuela’s revenues 
might decrease in the long run(Thinker Salas, 2009: 227). However, the opposite happened. 
Despite this situation, the revenues increased temporarily. 
  In 1973 during the administration of Rafael Caldera of COPEI the oil exporting countries 
faced an oil crisis. The OPEC proclaimed an oil embargo on countries which were supporting 
Israel in the Yom Kippur War (Markus, 2015: 247). By the end of the embargo the oil price had 
quadrupled (Rabe, 1982: 8). However, Venezuela could not profit from this price increase for a 
longer period of time. It did not create wealth, but a second Dutch Disease (Markus, 2015: 247). 
In 1976 former Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons of Venezuela Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo 
warned the country for a possible future economic malaise:  “Ten years from now, twenty years 
from now, you will see, oil will bring us ruin... It is the devil's excrement” (Maass, 2009: 211). 
Pérez Alfonzo was stating that on one hand oil was bringing Venezuela wealth, but on the other 
hand it brought instability and insecurity. It was another warning sign for the need of 
diversification. Venezuela, and also the other OPEC countries, were still highly depending on oil. 
  Carlos Andrés Pérez intended to listen to such warnings and was determined to diversify 
the economy by subsidies and took the final steps to nationalize the Venezuelan oil industry. In 
1976 the Venezuelan state-owned oil and natural gas company Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. 
(PDVSA) was founded. However, the structure of the company did not radically change. Foreign 
oil companies were replaced by Venezuelan oil companies, who in their turn were owned by a 
company called Petroven which was owned by the state (Bye, 1979: 67). PDVSA was not fully 
nationalized. Venezuelans who used to work in the oil sector kept their positions. This step did 
not change the oil industry, but it did eliminated the influence from foreign oil companies. 
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2.5 Oil and socialism: the beginning of the Chávez era 
In the beginning of the 1980s Venezuela was economically and politically relatively stable on the 
international stage. Venezuela became an example of growth because of the oil bonanza. The 
domestic picture was less perfect. As the Pacto de Punto Fijo was not free of corruption cracks in 
the government system were starting to get visible. Dropping international oil prices made this 
worse. On Friday the 18th of February 1983, called Viernes Negro, oil prices had dropped 
dramatically forcing the government to devaluate the local currency Bolívar (Brading, 2013: 46). 
In addition, the country remained depended and influenced by the US. The relationship between 
the three dominant Punto Fijo parties and the military had never been a trustful one. Money for 
hand-outs to trustees and the military started to decrease. The military was economically 
suffering and lacked basic needs. It was around this time that officers like Hugo Chávez got 
unsatisfied with the Venezuelan politics and organized themselves in order to make a plan to 
overthrow the corrupt government (Brading, 2013: 46). 
  By the end of the 1980s public discontent was rising. The Venezuelan people had enough 
of the corruption of the neoliberal political system which was leading towards impoverishment 
(Gallegos, 2012: 35). When Carlos Andrés Pérez took office for the second time in 1989, ten 
years after his first term as president, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank advised him to restructure the economy. Paradoxically, he cursed the IMF during his 
election campaign (Tariq, 2006), but implemented the plan. The IMF and the World Bank are 
international organizations founded and governed by the United States. Because of strong US 
influences it seemed likely Venezuela had no choice but to implement the economic plans of the 
IMF and World Bank. The economic measures included: ending price controls, devaluing the 
currency, large and successive reductions on import tariffs, increasing prices on public goods 
and services, reducing taxes on business and the wealthy and liberalising interest rates (Joquera, 
2003: 10). These measures were affecting a large part of the Venezuelan population, because for 
example the price increase on public goods and services was effecting the income of many 
Venezuelans. 
  Shortly after these economic implementations a response to express the discontent of 
the public followed. Heavy protests and riots in Venezuela’s capital city Caracas started. They 
were called the Caracazo. This historic event, together with the public and military discontent 
was leading towards an anti-neoliberalism sentiment. It resulted in the creation of Chávez’s 
Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement-200 (Pellicer & Reyes, 2012: 8). The creation of this 
movement was one of the first steps Chávez was taking to end the Pacto de Punto Fijo and create 
a plan to overthrow the government. 
 As a response to the dropping oil prices, and an economy which still was lacking 
diversification, Carlos Andrés Pérez decided to open the oil field once more for foreign 
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investment again (Miller, 2004: 825). This policy was called Apertura Petrolera. It could not 
avoid deterioration of the economic and political situation. Important groups, such as the 
military and the Venezuelan people, had turned against the government of Andrés Pérez. It was 
the right moment for Hugo Chávez to plan a coup d'état. In 1992 he did an attempt to overthrow 
the government. He failed and ended up in prison. His Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement-200 
did not gave up and later that year there was another failed coup d'état attempt. However, these 
attempts did bring Chávez to the centre of attention among Venezuelans. For many who were 
dissatisfied with the government Chávez was seen as a national hero and a symbol of hope 
(Brading, 2013: 51, Pellicer & Reyes, 2012: 8). By means of his acts against the government he 
positioned himself among Venezuelan people who were unsatisfied with the government. He 
publicly expressed his dissatisfaction with this Punto Fijo government and the way the country 
had been ruled for the previous decades. During the Caldera regime in 1994 Chávez was 
released from prison. 
  Four years later in 1998 he had the possibility to run for president. During his campaign 
Chávez blamed Venezuela’s ills on the Pacto de Punto Fijo and the use of oil revenues to maintain 
privileges for limited segments of society as poverty continued to increase through the country 
(Tinker Salas, 2009: 249). 
 
2.6 The roots of chavismo in the Venezuelan history regarding oil abundance and 
international affairs 
The aim of this historical analysis was to analyse the history of oil abundance in Venezuela in the 
context of its international relations and oil policies on a political and economic level. Cox’s 
triangle would help with this analysis in order to demonstrate how the lines of forces would run 
between material capabilities, ideas and institutions.  
  One can conclude that the history remained turbulent throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth century on a political, economic and social level. It had been heavily dominated by 
Venezuelan oil abundance on every level. 
  The independence from Spain did not bring Venezuela the freedom Simón Bolívar hoped 
for. The country remained divided and dominated by caudillismo, which brought more 
instability. Revenues from agriculture did not bring economic prosperity either. The discovery of 
significant oil reserves and global industrialisation raised the expectations for a brighter future 
for Venezuela and its people. During the regime of Juan Vicente Gómez in the beginning of the 
twentieth century oil wells were drilled with the help of foreign multinationals. The Venezuelan 
domestic and foreign policy started to be dominated by its oil production. Large parts of the 
revenues were going to the foreign oil companies and hand-outs to a small group of loyal 
supporters of the president. The majority of the Venezuelan people were not profiting much 
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from the oil riches and Gómez ruled as a dictator for almost three decades. He oppressed any 
form of opposition. Foreign oil companies were shaping the Venezuelan demography and caused 
even a more shattered society with their imposed labour autocracy. Despite domestic inequality, 
Venezuela became worldwide one of the biggest oil exporters by having a foreign policy 
strengthened by oil revenues. Dictatorial rule remained until the 1950s when the country 
experienced a political shift. The country went from an autocracy to a patridocacia ruled by AD, 
COPEI and URD. Pacto de Punto Fijo was not as democratic as it seemed, because the three 
political parties dominated the government for almost four decades and corruption remained. 
The United States intervened in several ways in Venezuela and the region to avoid the country 
becoming part of a united communist South American block. The oil embargo in the 70s and the 
dropping oil prices did not help to improve the situation in Venezuela either. It fostered 
discontent among its people. The economy was still highly depending on oil. There had been 
initiatives to diversify the economy, but they were not radical enough. The frequent change of 
politicians did not help either to find a possibility to create for example a sovereign wealth fund 
to save the oil money for future global price drops. Thus, with every price shock the oil price was 
getting, Venezuela was suffering too. The opposition of the government had more than enough of 
facing politicians fail continuously. Hugo Chávez was one of these opposition members and 
founded Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement-200. His ideas reached all the way back to the start 
of this chapter. He saw the mismanagement of his country by a small group of political elite and 
foreign oil companies, just as Bolívar saw it in the colonial time when the Spanish dominated 
South America. He wished to see equality among the Venezuelan people and finally letting them 
profiting from the oil revenues and not just a small majority. In addition, the dominance by the 
foreign oil companies and intervention from the United States should be eliminated. This 
historical analysis demonstrates that the roots of Hugo Chávez ideas for chavismo on a national 
and international level are laying in the Venezuelan history. 
  Interesting to see when applying Robert Cox’s triangle method with the three forces 
material capabilities, ideas and institutions to the case is that throughout Venezuelan history 
there had been an incredible shift in forces, and how these forces influence each other. Because, 
the way in which the lines of forces run is always a historical question to be answered by the 
particular case study (Cox, 1996: 98). First the three forces will be discussed individually from 
an international political economy perspective. Because they always interact with each other 
and never are singular entities, their interaction will be discussed secondly. 
  The first force of Cox’s method to this case demonstrates there is an incredible shift in 
material capabilities. In the beginning of the nineteenth century traditional agricultural products 
were dominating the economy. They were facilitating labour and accumulating wealth. When oil 
abundance was discovered and became an important export product in the beginning of the 
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twentieth century the dependence on traditional agricultural products eroded. Material 
capabilities changed radically, oil was destructive for the agricultural sector and the 
demography, but became productive in terms that it accumulated even more wealth 
economically. The country came to depend rapidly on domestic oil production and on the 
international demand of oil. Material capabilities changed from agriculture to oil production by 
the end of the nineteenth century. It shifted throughout history from productive, to destructive, 
to productive again, because of the change of sector. In addition, the natural resource brought a 
higher income in comparison to agriculture, therefore material capabilities became the most 
dominant force in the triangle on a national and international level, heavily influencing the other 
two factors. 
  The second force of Cox’s triangle heavily fluctuated. The ideas in Venezuela had been 
very different, but paradoxically, very much the same. Initially all politicians in Venezuela 
wanted a better Venezuela in terms of economy and politics. However, they disputed over how 
they wanted to accomplish this goal. The dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gómez was beneficial for 
the upper layer of society, but the Pacto Punto Fijo was beneficial for the Venezuelan middle 
class. Both regimes were having oil revenues at their disposal, so in both cases the economy 
flourished, always depending on the price of oil on the international oil market. Again, the 
material capabilities were what made the ideas in Venezuela heavily fluctuate through time. 
During the Chávez administration ideas changed even more radically. Chávez was against the 
ideas of the dictatorships and against Pacto Punto Fijo. His ideas changed into a dominant 
ideology called chavismo. This ideology and its impact will be more extensively analysed in the 
third chapter, because it is specifically connected to the Hugo Chávez administration. 
  The third force of Cox’s triangle, institutions changed as well. In the nineteenth century 
the country was dominated by Spanish rule, later by caudillismo and several presidents. When 
Juan Vicente Goméz came to power in the beginning of the twentieth century there was a 
continuing form of dictatorship for several decades. Under Spanish rule power was divided over 
the country and several regional caudillos. In a dictatorship power is dominated by one person 
in an autocratic manner. The role of the state as an institution became and remained centralized. 
Even when the dictatorship ended, the state remained organised as one central institution. On an 
international level Venezuela had to adapt to global hegemonic trends by implementing a 
centralized role of the state, in order to remain an important player on the international oil 
market and generate high revenues from oil. 
  All forces always interact with each other. Changes in the international political economy 
of a country, or on a global level, can shift the way in which the lines between the forces run, 
how dominant they are or how they interact between each other. The change of the material 
capability from agriculture to oil was an enormous turning point in Venezuela. Rapid industrial 
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global changes fostered the need for oil, which made the value of this commodity rise. Countries 
like Venezuela with an abundance of this resource could profit economically. The income of the 
state was rising dramatically. To fully benefit the state had to centralize the institutions to create 
order. The change of institutions caused a shift in ideas on how to accomplish goals within the 
state. It was the material capability of oil and the global world order who changed and fostered 
institutionalization in Venezuela. 
  Before the discovery of oil, institutionalization was the main force, but it was not 
centralized, so it was hard to practice and implement ideas. Material capabilities were an 
important force to maintain the unstable system. All forces did influence each other, but weakly 
and poorly. The historic chapter demonstrates that after the discovery of oil, material 
capabilities became the main force to push and stabilize institutionalization, and change ideas 
several times. The dominance of oil in the political and economic arena in Venezuela made the 
country a petro-state. 
  The following empiric chapter will take this research a step further by analysing the case 
regarding the effect of oil abundance and Chavismo on Venezuela’s foreign policy during the 
administration of Hugo Chávez. 
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Chapter 3 
 The relationship between chavismo, oil abundance and Venezuela’s foreign policy 
during the presidency of Hugo Chávez 
 
Since Hugo Chávez came to power after the elections in 1998 the political climate in Venezuela 
changed radically on a domestic and international level. It marked an end to the traditional 
political arrangements pursued by previous governments (Tinker Salas, 2009: 206), such as 
dictatorial rule, partidocracia and political dominance of a small elite group. 
  The historic chapter demonstrated the roots of chavismo. Domestically Chávez wanted to 
implement domestic policies to improve the quality of life for the lower class which was till so 
far marginalized, he wanted to fully nationalize the oil industry which did not happen till so far 
and he wanted to get rid of the dominance of foreign oil companies and the United States in 
Venezuela. These were trends which dominated the political and economic arena in Venezuela 
for decades. Chávez, coming from a humble lower class family himself, saw while growing up the 
majority of the Venezuelan people was not profiting from the oil wealth. On the contrary, some 
even remained uneducated and had to live of very low incomes. Eliminating social inequality 
became an important aspect of Chávez’s domestic policy. 
  Regionally he wished to create a united and cooperative left-wing South America by 
establishing several multilateral regional projects. Internationally he also strengthened 
diplomatic relations with other socialist countries and one of his main goals was to resist US 
hegemony, or ‘US imperialism’ as he called it himself (Guzman, 2013).  
  How he wanted to accomplish his goals was very different from his predecessors. He 
chose a populist political discourse. This discourse resonates throughout the ideology chavismo, 
as part of the Bolivarian Revolution. It was heavily inspired by the work and writings of Simón 
Bolívar and therefor the revolution is named to honour him. The populist discourse is marked by 
the inducements of his domestic policy. Such as, the social programs, or during rhetoric 
manifestation in public on the street, or on his TV channel called Ola Presidente. As well his 
foreign policy contains a populist discourse by maintaining diplomatic multilateral and bilateral 
relationships with other likeminded socialist countries. 
  However, neither the reign of his predecessors, nor the Chávez administration was free 
from corruption. To accomplish his goals he had to bribe organisations or had to silence his 
opposition, or give hand-out to his loyal followers, to let them remain loyal. Both on a national 
and international level. 
  This empiric chapter will further analyse the relationship between chavismo, oil 
abundance and Venezuela’s foreign policy. It will answer the research question: what is the 
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effect of oil abundance on chavismo in Venezuela’s foreign policy during the administration of 
Hugo Chávez? In order to answer this question most accurate and analyze the Venezuelan 
foreign policy in relation to chavismo and oil abundance, one first needs to take a closer look at 
Venezuela’s domestic policy, to understand the roots of chavismo on a domestic level. Only then, 
one can understand what chavismo does on an international level and in this case how it 
manifests in the Venezuelan foreign policy. As demonstrated in the historic chapter by means of 
Robert Cox’s triangle of material capabilities, ideas and institutionalization, there is barely any 
aspect in Venezuelan politics, nor the economy, which can be separated from oil production. 
These three factors have influenced each other throughout history and will remain influencing 
each other in the contemporary history. Also this chapter will continue applying this method to 
the case in order to achieve a holistic and accurate outcome. 
  The structure of this empiric chapter will be divided in two main parts. First, the 
domestic policy under the presidency of Hugo Chávez in relationship to chavismo will be 
analyzed. In this paragraph the focus will be on several inducement and constraint the president 
implemented. Inducements were mainly the enormous amount of social programs which came 
in a diverse variety of forms and shapes. For example eliminating poverty, stimulating education, 
creating rights for minority groups and raising funds for people who wanted to start a small 
business. Constrains were anti-neoliberal reforms such as changing the constitution, eliminating 
opposition and controlling the media. Second, the foreign policy under the presidency of Hugo 
Chávez in relationship to chavismo will be analyzed. In this paragraph the focus will be on the 
regional relations and international relations. The regional relations will be divided in 
multilateral relations and bilateral relations. On a regional level Chávez created strong 
diplomatic ties with Cuba, Argentina and Bolivia. Regional unification was part of a wave of left 
wing politics in the region called the Latin American Pink tide. On an international level Chávez 
tried to foster relations with likeminded regimes such as Iran and China. Furthermore, to 
maintain these relations he created international organizations such as Bolivarian Alliance for 
the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) and PetroCaribe. This structure will provide a clear overview 
to analyze the connection between chavismo, oil abundance and the foreign policy of Hugo 
Chávez. 
  The first and following paragraph will start by analyzing the domestic policy of the Hugo 
Chávez administration in the light of Robert Cox’s triangle. 
 
3.1 The Venezuelan domestic policy during the Chávez administration 
When Hugo Chávez came to power in 1998 he had a clear vision of his intentions for Venezuela. 
In one of his first interviews after his election on Venezuelan television he points out his ideas: 
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We are constructing a democratic project. There is no way we will go backwards. Let’s go 
for a constituent assembly. Of course with the permission of the people. Let’s go for a 
diversified economy which generates jobs, which pulls Venezuela out of this dreadful 
misery. Let’s go for a political model which is democratic. Let’s go for a model of social 
integration, respecting education and human rights and Venezuelan values. In short, a 
real Venezuela, a new Venezuela (Pernía, 2016). 
In the interview he speaks to the camera as if he is communicating with the people directly. He 
barely looks at the journalist who is doing the interviews, but focusses on the camera. Chávez 
repeats the words ‘let’s go for…’ emphasizing his willingness and determination. He 
communicates his ideas in an outspoken way. This is rhetoric populist approach is part of 
chavismo. The content of his message is full of promises of a better Venezuela. He addressed 
goals which had not been reached by previous governments, not implemented. Paradoxically, 
some of these ideas are in contrast to his later actions. In addition, he does not talk about certain 
changes he wishes to implement. For example, he does not publically say ‘let’s marginalize the 
opposition and let’s control the media’. Clearly, he only speaks about the inducements on public 
television to comfort and reassure the Venezuelan people. There is no word about the 
constraints, because this would increase his opposition. 
Inducements of Chávez’s domestic policy 
Inducements are stimulating initiatives for certain groups of people to make them act in a 
desired certain way. In this case inducements during the Chávez administration were necessary 
to gain loyalty from Venezuelan people. However, at the same time, these inducements were 
helping to improve the quality of life of these people. The most important target groups for 
Chávez were marginalized groups of society. 
  The largest group were the lower class and the poor Venezuelans. For Chávez it was 
important to gain support from this group, because when he just came to power the half of the 
Venezuelan population lived in poverty or extreme poverty (Sistema Estadístico Nacional, 
2015). Within this group of people were for example the illiterate, people with limited access to 
education and healthcare and people with disabilities. For them he created the famous misiones 
(Corrales & Penfold: 2011, 26). The misiones were social programs developed to improve the 
quality of life of the Venezuelan people. Most programs focused on eliminating poverty, 
stimulating education and social justice. There were also other programs helping people to start 
up a small business, stimulating the development of culture and identity creation among the 
Venezuelan people. When we look at the improvement of the quality of life the misiones did 
eliminate poverty when Chávez implemented them. Between 1998 and 2006 the poverty rate in 
Venezuela dropped with 31 percent (Sistema Estadístico Nacional, 2015). This is a substantial 
decrease. However, his actions were not merely praised. Brading argues it was a challenge to get 
the funds for the misiones at the right places, because there was personnel complaining they did 
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not received their wages for months (2013: 112-113). Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold 
confirm and ratify this statement by arguing the misiones were inefficient (2011, 26). Despite the 
rising standards of a part of the Venezuelan society, not all the funds were not reaching the right 
places. The Chávez administration was not free from corruption and there could be a possibility 
the fund for social spending was ending up in other pockets. 
  In addition, there were misiones for indigenous people in Venezuela. The indigenous 
people in Venezuela are an ethnic minority group who are the descendants of the first 
inhabitants before the Spanish occupation of the territory which is now called Venezuela. This 
group of society was an important minority because Chávez gave this marginalized group rights 
which had been ignored by previous administrations (Angosto-Ferrández, 2014: 145). Often 
they had been the less ‘modern western’ educated part of society. Therefore, for them it had 
been harder to find jobs, they often remained poor and lacked access to global communication 
networks. This last part had been maintained by the state according to Kathryn Lehman. She 
argues that indigenous groups have been enabled to gain access to international legal 
instruments that assist them in territorial and cultural demands, these instruments contribute to 
decolonize knowledge hierarchies and to present alternative forms of governance (Lehman, 
2014: 117). This had been the case in Venezuela. Chávez gave the indigenous population a voice 
and rights they did not have before. 
   Furthermore, Chávez implemented technical committees and community organisations 
to come up with solutions to the serious problems of social services in poor urban 
neighbourhoods (Escobar, 2010: 15). The idea behind this was to stimulate direct democracy 
and participation. Venezuelan people would actively participate in solving problems within their 
own living area. It increases the feeling of inclusion and participation.  
  The misiones, technical committees and community organisations were an inducement 
for society, because they had to have a visible proof in their own environment of how the 
country was improving to remain loyal to Chávez. These inducement in the domestic policy are 
one of the most important pillars of the chavismo ideology. Between 2003 and 2007 when public 
spending was at its highest levels the popularity was increasing as well (Corrales & Penfold, 
2011: 57). By lots of public spending he created chavista supporters. 
  However, not all poor Venezuelan citizens have been helped by Chávez’s social spending. 
Laura Enríquez argues it did not improve the quality of life and business of the rural and 
agricultural poor of Venezuela, because there was too little investment in the agricultural sector 
(Enríquez, 2013: 617). A large part of investment went to the oil industry, which further 
impoverished this sector and its people. 
  Most important for this research is that this way of social spending was funded with oil 
revenues (Weisbrot & Sandoval, 2007: 9). Interesting is that on the international oil market the 
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prices were rising in the beginning of Chávez’s presidency. Therefore, he could afford to increase 
public spending and let his popularity grow. Referring to Cox’s triangle, Chávez’s ideas of 
chavismo were made possible by the material capabilities of oil. Without the material capabilities 
these ideas could not be implemented and the president would not receive such high levels of 
popular support. 
  However, the other side of the coin were the constraints limiting a part of Venezuelan 
society. 
Constraints of Chávez’s domestic policy 
The Venezuelan middle class was the part of society which noticed the constraints of Chávez’s 
domestic policy first. They were mainly in Chávez’s opposition and in PDVSA. 
  In 1999 Chávez changed the constitution. The new constitution was preventing the 
privatization of the oil industry and other sectors, enlarging the president’s power, extending his 
time in office, implementing a new sovereign wealth fund and restructuring the oil tax (Markus, 
2015: 248). The middle class was suffering from the nationalization of the public sector 
companies. For example, parts of the construction sector and electricity companies were 
nationalized, people lost their jobs and projects remained unfinished, because government 
spending did not reach the companies. 
  Main changes were made in the oil sector. The oil sector needed to be nationalized to let 
Venezuela benefit from the oil revenues and exclude foreign oil companies. The nationalization 
was part of the battle against US hegemony (see next paragraph). Apart from passing laws that 
in essence renationalize the industry he was replacing the board of directors of PDVSA (Tinker 
Salas, 2009: 249). Also PDVSA’s president was fired, because he accused him of making contracts 
which only benefitted the PDVSA management (Markus, 2015: 249). Paradoxically, Chávez was 
transforming the constitution to gain governmental power. He fired the PDVSA staff who were 
practicing similar forms of clientelism as he did himself. Furthermore, the PDVSA staff was 
appointed by the previous capitalist regimes and Chávez needed his own supporters in the 
Venezuelan oil company to not lose control over his biggest source of income. The PDVSA 
workforce went through comparable changes. In 2002 when they went on a massive strike half 
of the workforce was fired (Markus, 2015: 249). Most of the PDVSA employees were middle 
class citizens. This change was another event increasing discontent among the Venezuelan 
middle class. 
  In addition, he kept track on his disloyal opposition by means of the lista Tascón 
(Tascón’s list) (Corrales & Penfold: 2011, 27). This list was published on the internet. When one 
was on the list they could lose their job, be excluded from new job contracts or social benefits. It 
was a threat for his opposition. 
  Another constraint is the limited publicity of items in the media. The media were allowed 
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to operate, but stiff regulations were imposed on the content (Constitución de la Republica 
Bolivariana de Venezuela 1999: Artículo 58). Interesting is that in return for the control over the 
media Chávez broadcasted his own TV show called Ola Presidente. When looking at some of his 
shows one notices he interacts with his public, answers questions of ordinary Venezuelans and 
travels to all corners of the country to record his show. This is a profoundly social initiative. 
Showing commitment to the public is another important part of chavismo. On the other hand, by 
the opposition this form of chavismo propaganda was called Venezolanization (Kitzberger, 2012: 
130). One can hear him talking for hours about the success of the Bolivarian Revolution or how 
important the prosperity of the oil industry is for the Venezuelan people. Kitzberger argues 
Venezuela’s institutional weakness accounts for the radicalization of Bolivarian communication 
politics (2012: 134). Thus, this form of communication part of the ideas can be seen as a mask to 
cover up flaws and corruption in the institutionalization. 
  The rhetoric populist discourse of the TV channel Ola Presidente goes hand in hand with 
the misiones, unifying the lower class Venezuelan population, but widening the gap between the 
lower class and fostering the discontent among middle-class Venezuelans. In fact, the 
Venezolanization was polarizing Venezuela on a social level by the implementation of the anti-
neoliberal constraints.  
  At the same time Chávez was threatening and eliminating his opposition. Venezuelans 
who would be against his domestic policy, who would not support his chavista ideology or plot 
against him would suffer from inhuman consequences. When one loses his job, gets excluded 
from social benefits and has not prospect on getting another job, one would have no income and 
end up on the street. His constraints did not make his domestic policy a democratic one, because 
there was a limited choice of political options and if not in favor of the regime one would suffer. 
His actions were contradicting his words of the interview he gave on television when he just 
came to power in which he is speaking of a social and democratic model of Venezuela to move 
forward (Pernía, 2016). 
  Chávez’s chavista ideas have heavily influences the institutionalization of the Venezuelan 
state. In fact, it had even radically changed the institutionalization. Only by means of the material 
capabilities of oil in a centralized state the inducements and constraints have their desired effect. 
These ideas in the domestic policy are a cornerstone of the ideas in the foreign policy under the 
Chávez administration, because they are based on the same chavista ideology. 
 
3.2 The Venezuelan foreign policy during the Chávez administration 
Not only Hugo Chávez’s domestic policy was characterized by chavismo, also many aspects of its 
foreign policy were permeated by this ideology. Mostly, it contained a very strong anti-US 
hegemony and anti-neoliberal sentiment. In the domestic Venezuelan policy the US mainly had 
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been used as a scapegoat, the foreign policy took active measures to exclude US capitalist 
hegemony and to create chavismo hegemony. Furthermore, on a regional level Venezuela had 
particularly strong diplomatic relations with Cuba and on an international level it strengthened 
ties with China. It also created enemies, not only with the United States, but also with for 
example other Latin American countries such as Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Paraguay. On 
a regional and international level Chávez maintained an active foreign policy towards the 
establishment of several international organizations to foster collaboration in the region and 
among likeminded countries. 
  First, this paragraph will explain Venezuelan US diplomatic bilateral relations because it 
is a central topic in the Venezuelan foreign policy which must be clear in order to understand the 
relations Venezuela has with other countries on a regional and international level. 
Venezuelan – United States Relations 
The historical events in the second chapter have demonstrate the United States had been an 
important influence in Venezuelan politics and economics. On the level of material capabilities 
the US was depending on Venezuelan of oil, and Venezuela was depending on the demand of the 
United States for the income of oil revenues. Foreign oil companies from the US dominated the 
Venezuelan workforce and also the social life of citizens, thus even Venezuelan ideas and the 
institutionalization was influenced by the US Economically this was a reciprocal and beneficial 
agreement for both countries. Socially and politically President Hugo Chávez wanted to 
eliminate US influence in Venezuela. Therefore, a part of his chavismo ideology was an anti-US 
policy, and an anti-capitalist hegemony.  
 How Chávez implements this anti-US policy is similar to the implication in the domestic 
sphere. The nationalization of the oil industry was one of the first steps. With this move he 
excluded the US from the Venezuelan political and economic arena. Furthermore, he uses his 
popular rhetoric discourse to strengthen his ideas and messages. On his Ola Presidente TV 
channel he uses the US as a scapegoat, to demonstrate power to the public and threaten the US. 
For example by saying “You are a monkey mister Danger” (Guzman, 2013). He calls the former 
president of the United States George W. Bush “Mister Danger”. With these words he is referring 
to Bush being an incapable US imperialist practicing capitalist hegemony which Chávez sees as a 
danger to Venezuela, Latin America and the world. This message is directed to the Venezuelan 
people, but also to a broader public. Just as his words during a public populist rhetoric 
manifestation on the street regarding a dispute Bolivia has with the United States. He tells the US 
ambassador to leave the country and publically curses the United States (Cabiozgz, 2014). His 
words are threatening and offensive while speaking loud. Clearly, when his words become more 
aggressive and his voice rises, the populist popularity is increasing among the public. They get 
enthusiastic and start to cheer louder. 
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  During a speech on the 20th of September 2006 at the United Nations Assembly Chávez 
takes the anti-US sentiment a step further. In his speech Chávez talks about the devil referring 
again to President George W. Bush: 
Yesterday, the devil came here. Right here. Right here. And it smells of sulfur still today,  
here on this table that I am now standing in front of… As the spokesman of imperialism 
he came to share his nostrums, to trying to preserve the current pattern of domination, 
exploitation and pillage of the peoples of the world… The American empire is doing all it 
can to consolidate its system of domination. And we cannot allow them to do that. We 
cannot allow world dictatorship to be consolidated (CNN, 2013). 
 This time his audience were not some screaming chavistas in the streets of Caracas, but heads of 
state of the members of the United Nations. This times message was directed towards a large 
international public of high importance. Neither he was in his home territory in Venezuela, but 
in New York. Chávez’s words clearly demonstrate an anti-US sentiment, but by choosing to hold 
this speech for an internationally high official public, he draws his chavismo ideology and 
populist rhetoric to an international level. He gets away with spreading his ideas here, because 
his material capabilities are a large part of the global oil reserves several member of the United 
Nations are depending on. His populist rhetoric could be seen as a threat to not contradict him, 
because he could stop oil supplies and this would harm energy security. But also as just a non-
violent populist show. 
 Harold A. Trinkunas supports this last argument by stating the US has nothing to fear 
from Venezuela (2011: 28). Analyzing Chávez’s domestic and foreign policy in relationship to 
chavismo, Chávez’s populist rhetoric is merely to provocate and spread chavismo discourse on a 
national and international level. He might threatened the United States with his words, but his 
actions remained relatively harmless. The US might have been excluded from the oil production 
scene in Venezuela, but Chávez did have social programs in the US Citgo, the Venezuelan 
government's Texas-based oil subsidiary was providing free heating oil to low income families 
throughout the northeastern United States (Palmer, 2010: 27). This paradoxical aspect shows 
Venezuela had not fully excluded the United States from all aspects of its economy, but a strong 
anti-US sentiment remained throughout its foreign policy. 
  Important to bear in mind for the following two paragraphs about regional and 
international foreign relations is that Chávez his anti-US policy is not only included in his 
domestic, but also in his foreign policy. He tries to actively convince other states of his ideas to 
unify them and create a chavismo hegemony in the region to counterwork US hegemony and 
foster centralized institutionalization. Within the Latin American and Caribbean region his 
actions, resulted in a wave of left wing politics in the region during the Chávez administration, 
contradicting the right-wing western politics. 
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Venezuelan Regional Relations within Latin America and the Caribbean 
The wave of left-wing politics was called the Pink tide (Remmer, 2012; Rosales, 2013). Again, 
when analyzing certain events in the historic chapter this trend is not just a contemporary one. 
Throughout Venezuelan and world history there had been several waves of left-wing politics. 
For example when Romulo Betancourt was exiled and got interested in communism during the 
1930s, or in the 1950s during the Cuban Revolution. It had been an important ongoing trend 
which sometimes had been overlooked by scholars arguing Pink tide was some new invention in 
regional politics (Remmer, 2012; Rosales, 2013). Tim Anderson does agree with the historical 
importance of this trend regarding the creation of regional organizations in the region by 
arguing that the political genealogy of these Venezuelan led initiatives has a direct connection 
with 19th century Latin Americanist integration ideals (Anderson, 2014: 15). After a wave of 
right-wing politics in the 1990s, Chávez took office and implemented left-wing politics in 
Venezuela short after the turn of the millennium. This was again a dominant trend in the region 
and Chávez benefitted from this wave by creating several regional organizations to strengthen 
diplomatic ties with countries in the region for Latin American integration. 
Multilateral Relations 
One of the first international organization Hugo Chávez created during his presidency was the 
Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of Our Americas (ALBA) in 2004. The main objective of 
this organization was regional cooperation and integration on a social, political and economic 
level. The ideology behind the organization are the principles of the socialist Bolivarian ideals of 
Hugo Chávez. The eleven member states of the ALBA are mainly the Caribbean islands Antigua 
and Barbuda, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines and the countries Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela. These countries have 
mainly social democratic governments. Antulio Rosales argues the ALBA privileges Venezuela’s 
oil diplomacy and increasing cooperation with companies from the emerging powers (2013: 
1453). In addition, Norman Girvan argues the ALBA should be seen as one expression of a 
process of reconfiguration in world and hemispheric affairs (2011: 132). Chávez intended to 
stimulate economic cooperation among likeminded countries providing them with an increasing 
economic growth by the means of oil revenues. Analyzing the position of Venezuela and the 
Caribbean states one could argue in addition to Rosales and Girvan he was establishing a strong 
geopolitical block of allies surrounding him to counteract western capitalist influences. 
  In 2005 Chávez created PetroCaribe. An Energy Cooperation Agreement initiated by the 
Government of Venezuela to provide preferential payment arrangement for petroleum and 
petroleum products to several Caribbean countries (Caricom, 2013). Interesting is that 
PetroCaribe has similar Caribbean participants as the ALBA. This indicates Venezuela intended 
to even further strengthen diplomatic ties with countries in the region and create financial 
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dependence. Rodrigo Acuña confirms this dependence arguing that the organization was their 
country’s lifeblood essential to maintain their fragile public finances (2014: 81). Anthony P. 
Maingot denies this dependence by arguing the sophistication of Caribbean democrats is the 
main barrier to Chávez’s lack of intellectual sophistication and penchant for braggadocio, the 
Caribbean leaders find his socialism confusing and ultimately unconvincing (2011: 118). 
However, the percentage of dependence in 2012 contradict this statement. The Caribbean 
countries might have experienced his approach as confusing and unconvincing, but by 2012 
Venezuela’s petro-policy was covering more than 40% of the region’s energy demands (Acuña, 
2014: 81). Furthermore, Norman Girvan’s arguments confirms this percentage by stating that 
the growth of relations between several ALBA and PetroCaribe states is one of the most 
significant recent developments in Venezuelan regional affairs (2011: 116). The opinions 
regarding the effect of PetroCaribe on the regional relations are heavily divided, but the 
organisation did create dependence on Venezuelan oil. 
  In addition to the creation of the ALBA and PetroCaribe, Venezuela strengthened 
multilateral relations with countries in the region by actively participating in the establishment 
of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Community of Latin American and 
Caribbean States (CELAC), and the monetary fund as a regional replacement of the IMF called 
Banco del Sur. All organisations were established to stimulate regional cooperation and 
multilateral relations. Furthermore, the organisations fostered institutionalization in the region 
to shape a block of likeminded allies with similar ideas surrounding Venezuela and create 
dependence on Venezuelan material capabilities of oil. However, the bilateral relations were just 
as important to Venezuela. Even more to establish these multilateral relations. 
Bilateral Relations 
Important regional bilateral relations for Venezuela were for example the ones with Argentina 
and Bolivia, of which the on with Cuba can be considered of the most strong and fruitful one. 
However, Venezuela also made enemies with countries in the region such as Peru and Paraguay. 
  Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez were close allies before Chávez became president. Castro 
saw in Chávez the companion with likeminded ideas he needed as an ally to finance and 
stimulate his communist project and medical diplomacy. Furthermore, they both wished to 
eliminate US influence in the region. In 1994 Castro invited Chávez to visit Havana. Both gave a 
speech at Havana University. Castro is praising in his speech Chávez’s Revolutionary Bolivarian 
Movement-200 and Chávez’s ideas by stating “And above all, we extraordinarily value those 
Bolivarian ideas” (TeleSUR English, 2014). Finally, when Chávez came to power Cuba became 
one of the most important allies of Venezuela. The diplomatic relation was not only based on 
likeminded Bolivarian ideas, but also on the oil-for-doctors trade agreements (Feinsilver, 2010: 
91). The agreement provides Venezuela with a broad variety of health care services and Cuba 
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gets provided with oil and finances derived from Venezuelan oil revenues to subsidize this 
project.  However, Venezuela is Cuba’s most significant trading partner. Feinsilver argues when 
Venezuela suffers from and economic collapse, so might Cuba (2010: 100). Cuba became 
depended on the Venezuelan material capabilities, and it is not the only country in the region. 
  Argentina for example became another country depending on Venezuelan oil revenues. 
When Chávez came to power he strengthen diplomatic ties with the left-wing regime of Néstor 
Kirchner and his wife Cristina Kirchner in Argentina. In 2005 and 2007 Venezuela helped this 
ally on a financial level. When Argentina tried to pay off its $ 9.8 billion debt to the IMF 
Venezuela provided a $2.3 billion credit to Argentina in 2005 (Hogenboom, 2012: 149). This was 
not the last financial injection from Venezuela to Argentina. In addition, there was another 
transaction towards Argentina which was not legal. In 2007 a Venezuelan-US businessman was 
arrested at the airport in Buenos Aires carrying in his suitcase $800.000 in undeclared funds 
slated to be used to help finance Cristina Kirschner’s campaign for president (Corrales & 
Penfold, 2011: 108). Interesting about these transactions it that it raises several questions on a 
economic and political level. First, with this enormous debt Argentina has, one might wonder if it 
will ever come to the point to pay Venezuela this money back. Second, domestically the donation 
of this large sum of money might cause friction, because it could be invested on a national level 
in for example the elimination of poverty or diversification of the economy. Third, regarding 
corruption, both transactions are a form of clientelism. In particular, the transaction of 2007 
questions Venezuela’s financial transparency and legitimacy. Not only on a domestic level, but 
also on an international level corruption remained in the Venezuelan policy. Furthermore, the 
financial aid from Venezuela made Argentina depending on Venezuela, just as in the case of 
Cuba, but even more significantly, because Cuba had a diversified domestic and international 
medical policy in return, but Argentina is only taking and does not provide any trading 
commodity in return then the likeminded bilateral relationship itself. 
  The Argentinean neighbour Bolivia received Venezuelan aid by distributing checks 
payable to local mayors and citizens as part of the ALBA (Corrales & Penfold, 2011: 107). The 
left-wing government of Evo Morales supported the same ideas as Chávez’s Bolivarian 
Revolution, but just like Argentina, it had no trading commodity in return like Cuba. An example, 
of Chávez’s social support was publicly demonstrated this in a speech when Bolivia has a dispute 
with the US helping Evo Morales (Cabiozgz, 2014). Furthermore, Bolivia was in a triangle block 
with Cuba and Venezuela receiving as well healthcare service from Cuba at Venezuela’s expenses 
(Feinsilver, 2010: 91). The diplomatic relation with Bolivia was maintain on and economic, 
social and ideological level. Just like Argentina and Cuba till a certain extent, Bolivia came to 
depend on Venezuelan oil revenues. 
  Not all countries in the region were supported by Venezuelan trade and aid. Ring-wing 
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governments in the region did not receive any support from Chávez, because these countries 
were have a neoliberal agenda and often receiving support from the United States (Gardini & 
Lambert, 2011: 168). This was counterworking Chávez Bolivarian ideology. Chávez actively 
opposed these neoliberal governments by supporting their opponents. In countries such as 
Mexico, Chile, Peru and Colombia, Chávez used oil revenues to fund left-wing opposition 
movements against the governments (Castañeda, 2011:156). An example of one of these left-
wing anti-neoliberal movements who Chávez supported financially was the FARC (Gardini & 
Lambert, 2011: 166). These were unofficial payments not supporting, but counteracting these 
governments. Of course these countries were not amused by Chávez actions, because these left-
wing movements could become more powerful by such support and overthrow their right-wing 
governments. However, this was indirectly one on the main aims of chavismo, to create a united 
left-wing Latin America. Therefore, for Mexico, Chile, Peru and Colombia the Chávez 
administration formed a threat. 
  Another moment during the Chávez administration in which Venezuela did not make 
friends was when it wanted to become member of the South American trade block MERCOSUR. 
In 2006 the proposal was approved in principal by the member states Argentina, Brazil and 
Uruguay, but the Paraguayan Senate rejected the proposal (Gardini & Lambert, 2011: 168). The 
trade bloc could only welcome a new member if all states agree. According to Paraguay 
Venezuela was too left-wing for a trade block with capitalist principals (Gardini & Lambert, 
2011: 168). The rejection brought tensions to the relationship between Paraguay and Venezuela. 
  Clearly Venezuela and the Latin American and Caribbean region went through significant 
changes regarding its multilateral and bilateral relations. Strategically Venezuela made friends 
and enemies with its Bolivarian actions. Projects and arrangements were not only implemented 
in Cuba, Argentina and Bolivia, but in many other socialist countries in the Latin American 
region. In particular countries included in the ALBA, PetroCaribe, CELAC and UNASUR received 
aid in several forms from Venezuela. One could argue Venezuela’s regional relations flourished 
during the time of Chávez presidency. However, these countries in the Latin American and 
Caribbean region came all to depend on Venezuela and together formed a socialist block to 
counteract the United States and other western influences. The opinions on Venezuela’s effort to 
increase regionalism are heavily divided. 
  Anderson argues that indirectly this wave of regionalism would have been facilitated by 
US foreign policy and its continuing belligerent role in the so-called new globalism (Anderson, 
2014: 31). In addition, he argues countries understand that this is mostly a publicity stunt from 
Venezuela meant to camouflage serious domestic abuses and dubious international pretentions 
(2011: 35). According to Anderson the US would indirectly still be interfering by helping the 
Latin American region by with regional unification and use its foreign policy as a mask to cover 
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domestic issues. Anthea McCarthy-Jones does not agree with this statement by pointing out this 
Venezuelan foreign policy and regional integration was to protect Latin American sovereignty 
and external threats (2014: 52). She points out that by creating a block of likeminded neighbor 
and regional countries around him he maintained his economic and political security. It is a 
geopolitical strategy to protect him from possible external political threats. 
  Furthermore, McCarthy-Jones argues the profile of Latin America and the Caribbean in 
the global order has been raised with the process of incremental institutionalization by the 
formation of these region organizations that accompanies the ideals of new regionalism 
(McCarthy-Jones, 2014: 51). In other words, by the creation of such organisation Chávez tried to 
establish a better position within the international arena not only for Venezuela, but for the 
Latin American and Caribbean region as a whole. Chávez foreign policy might not leaving 
enough space for Venezuelan domestic problems, but his presidency had been a prosperous 
period for Venezuela’s diplomatic relations within the region and beyond. 
  That Chávez foreign policy is reaching even further than the Latin American region 
demonstrates the relationship between Venezuelan allies China, Iran and Russia. 
Venezuelan International Relations beyond Latin America and the Caribbean 
During the administration of Hugo Chávez, just as the regional relations, the international 
relations with China, Iran and Russia were taken to a next level. 
  In particularly China became an important economic and political partner of Venezuela. 
The relationship is mainly based on credit investment in technology and energy production in 
exchange for Venezuelan oil (Hongbo, 2012: 224). Rosales’s argument points out the ideological 
reason behind this diplomatic relation saying China is a replacement of the United States as a 
hegemonic partner (2016: 572). The historic chapter demonstrated the US played a significant 
role in the domestic and international relations of Venezuela. Chávez tries to replace the 
relationship with this hegemonic capitalist partner, by strengthening ties with socialist 
countries. China is a good example in this case. In addition, Venezuela was depended on the 
import of oil towards Venezuela and needed not only a likeminded, but also an economically 
equal import partner for oil. However, there are challenges for China’s choice of Venezuela as a 
major importer of oil. Chinese oil companies must cope with the costs of relatively long distance 
oil shipment and the need to upgrade refinery technologies in order to receive the heavy crude 
oil imported from Venezuela (Hongbo, 2012: 236). This distance and the transportation costs 
might make Venezuela a less attractive trading partner. Additionally, Sun Hongbo argues only if 
Venezuela can produce oil normally, without economic setbacks or production drops for 
example, will the relationship between Venezuela and China be beneficial (Hongbo, 2012: 243). 
If not, diplomatic relations will be weakened and China might make agreements with another oil 
producer. With China being a significant and prosperous player in the global economy it does 
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not highly depend on Venezuelan oil production. If Venezuela cannot deliver what China needs, 
China will simply seek for another trading partner for its oil. For example, in the Arabian Gulf. 
This makes China somehow an unreliable trading partner for Venezuela. 
  Iran might be seen as a more reliable global trading partner. It would not be eager to 
seek relations for oil trade with its Arabic Gulf neighbors because of serious tensions regarding 
religious disputes in the region. However, the relationship between Iran and Venezuela was 
mainly ideological, but reciprocal. Iran was supporting Chávez’s Bolivarian revolution, in return 
Venezuela was supporting Iran’s ideas to become a nuclear nation counteracting the US and Iran 
would help Venezuela building a nuclear village in Venezuela (Clem et al., 2011: 12). 
  The diplomatic relationship with Russia, as well as with Iran, was ideological and 
beneficial for both side on a geopolitical level. It contained an anti-US policy and Russia provided 
arms in exchange for oil (Clem, 2011: 99). Russia’s collaboration with Venezuela did not came 
unexpected, because in 2008 the US had plans to install US missile defense in Poland, Russia’s 
response was to defend itself with military presence in the Caribbean (Clem, 2011: 99). 
  Venezuela strengthened ties with OPEC countries between 2000 and 2002. It hosted 
summit meetings in Caracas, visited all ten fellow OPEC countries and lobbied to raise the oil 
prices (Tinker Salas, 2015: 148). Most OPEC member states are autocratic or semi-democratic 
regimes. They are characterized by similar regimes types as Venezuela. Mostly, the regimes do 
not support US hegemony and are non-western countries functioning politically and 
economically in different ways. Strengthening OPEC ties was another chavismo strategy of 
Chávez to foster anti-US hegemony and unify likeminded countries. After all, they had oil as a 
strong weapon. 
  When looking at the geographical position and the regimes of all the countries it is clear 
Chávez intended to create a stronger non-hegemonic block of countries counterworking western 
imperialism and anti-US hegemony. By implementing this chavismo strategy he was promoting 
the global ‘us-versus-them’ thinking. The socialist or autocratic regimes against the democratic 
western regimes. 
  His domestic inducements and constraints were reflected in his foreign policy. Especially 
on a regional level he implemented a similar strategy. Countries received financial aid or 
political support, when they in return supported Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution and 
accompanied by that his chavista ideas. Just as he used this populistic strategy on a domestic 
level to create loyal supporters, he did this as well on an international level. 
  The creation of the ALBA can be seen as building a block of loyal partners around 
Venezuela, and between South and North America. It is a geopolitical strategy which several 
countries implement. For example Russia with the keeping Belarus and Ukraine as close allies, 
The United Kingdom by owning several islands in South Atlantic Ocean, or the US having a 
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military base on Cyprus. Such territories can be used in case of war to implement military posts 
to pressure the opponent. In the case of Venezuela, Chávez could use these islands in case of 
tensions between countries to threaten for example the US by building a military base on one of 
these islands, to practice political pressure. 
  Despite Hugo Chávez’s effort to strengthen ties with likeminded countries, he also 
strategically made enemies with countries having neoliberal regimes. A solution to this 
differentiating approach of strategically selecting friends and enemies could be by stimulating a 
dialogue among states. John Hobson criticizes such excluding approaches and suggests that 
states should escape such racial hierarchies by engaging in dialogue with each other (2009: 
115). An alternative approach from Chávez creating more harmony and perhaps more global 
hegemony could have been going beyond his mainstream approach and accepting the ‘other’ 
hegemonic states by stimulating a dialogue, instead of counterworking hegemonic states. In this 
way he could have had not only a beneficial foreign policy, but also success and respect with 
several hegemonic states, instead of fostering polarization and causing collateral damage. 
When again applying Robert Cox’s Triangle to the case we do not see such radical changes as in 
the historic chapter, because Chávez’s administration was a shorter period of time then the 
Venezuelan history after Spanish rule, until the 1990s. However, there are still interesting 
changes in how the lines of forces run in between the factors which help to answer the research 
question of what the relationship is between oil abundance, chavismo and the Venezuelan 
foreign policy during the Chávez administration. 
  Starting with analyzing the factors on a domestic level it becomes clear that material 
capabilities is the most central factor heavily influencing institutionalization and ideas. These last 
two factors were made possible by the material capability of oil. On a domestic level, the 
revenues of oil abundance were high under the Chávez regime, because of this he was financially 
capable to implement such policies and change the institutionalization. Oil abundance and 
favorable prices on the oil market during his regime gave him a high income, and therefore a lot 
of power. He made the state even more centralized then it was under his predecessors, by giving 
himself and his political party more power. Because of this high level of power he could get away 
with illegitimate transactions, clientelism and other forms of corruption. His chavismo ideas 
were possible because of oil abundance. Many of the social projects were financed with oil 
revenues. On an international level the lines of forces run in similar directions. Because of the 
high oil revenues Chávez was able to create such a large network of likeminded diplomatic allies. 
He used oil abundance as a tool to create allies and strategically create enemies, to centralize 
chavismo in the world order to counterwork of US hegemony. 
 Material capabilities of oil have been the cornerstone of Chávez policy making him 
capable of implementing his ideas and institutionalization. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this thesis I have explored the relationship between oil abundance, chavismo and Venezuela’s 
foreign policy during the Chávez administration.  
  The early statements in the oil abundance debate in the 1950s, that oil revenues in petro-
states would only bring economic prosperity, are in my opinion nowadays outdated and 
singular. They not apply to the case of Venezuela or any petro-state, except Norway till a certain 
extent, because in most of the case oil abundance has its positive and negative effects not only on 
the economy, but also on a countries politics and social dynamics. Throughout history we have 
seen oil brings benefits and challenges for petro-states such as Venezuela. The resource curse is 
a more feasible approach, because it does focus on these positive and negative effects of oil 
abundance. However, it has not been proved fully adequate to analyse the case of Venezuela, 
because it leaves certain important factors out. Specifically for this thesis it does not emphasis 
on foreign policies and populist politics. 
  The international political economy theory from Robert Cox’s critical and non-
hegemonic approach analyses the case from three important angles: economy, politics and 
socialism within an international framework. Material capabilities, ideas and institutionalization 
demonstrated the ongoing dependence and importance on oil in Venezuela, but also how this 
dependence made Hugo Chávez’s ideas and institutionalization possible. An interesting and 
positive outcome was that Venezuela’s foreign policy during the Chávez administration had not 
been such a disaster as several scholars analysing petro-states or Venezuela argue. On the 
contrary, Chávez had been quite cleaver implementing this international chavismo petro-policy. 
Domestically the Venezuelan middle class had been suffering because of his exuberant spending 
on foreign relations, but internationally this had been fruitful when Chávez was in office. On a 
regional level he created several pacts and arrangements to strengthen a regional collaboration 
between likeminded states. On a wider international level he was successfully strengthening ties 
with OPEC member states and other likeminded countries. However, the negative side is that his 
were policies not free from clientelism, patronage and nepotism. However, in every country 
there is a certain level of corruption. The question remains if there is really more corruption in 
Venezuela, or is data around these topics better protected in other western countries. However, 
this requires further research and above all more transparency from governments worldwide 
for accessible data. 
  The Chávez administration maintained a broad and far reaching foreign policy with 
mainly fruitful bilateral and multilateral relations with non-hegemonic, anti-US and anti-
capitalist countries. Chávez intended to spread an anti-neoliberal wave worldwide. His policy 
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was beneficial for the international relations of Venezuela, but not for the Venezuelan people or 
for unification on any level. On the contrary, his counterhegemonic policy towards the US had a 
negative effect widening the gap between Latin American States and the west. There was an 
increasing amount of countries turning their back towards hegemonic states fostering 
polarization. Venezuela was not only making friends, but also enemies with other Latin 
American countries. When Chávez would have embraced these differences, instead of fighting 
them, Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution would have perhaps had the character Simón Bolívar once 
wished for. However, this acceptance cannot be practiced by a singular state and should always 
come in a collective way. A non exceptionalistic Latin America would have been an outcome. 
 Furthermore, Chávez did not provide enough to financially secure the future of 
Venezuela and its foreign policy. Perhaps he was working towards this goal, but dropping oil 
prices and his death in 2013 thwarted his ideas. Therefore, his foreign policy was just a 
temporary success. It became the opposite of the Bolivarian Revolution he was working on. Soon 
after his death Venezuela was facing the most tragic economic, political and social situation it 
had never experienced throughout its entire history. Instead of celebrating a Bolivarian 
Revolution, Venezuela was now moving towards a Bolivarian countdown. 
  Chávez’s term fostered autocracy, but there always had been autocracy in Venezuela. It 
eroded democracy, but there always had been a low level of democracy. It counterworked 
globalization and global hegemony. However, all these factors got worse when the oil prices 
started to drop right before his death. Thus, as long as the prices on the international oil market 
were high, Venezuela would be able to implement chavismo in its policies and benefit from the 
oil abundance. If not, it would remain facing hard days over and over again. 
  Today in Venezuela under the presidency of Nicolás Maduro these hard days have 
arrived. The country is nearly bankrupt and not only the middle class is suffering, but all people 
from Venezuela. The politics and economy had reached a dramatically low level it never had 
reached before. Maduro is neither having the money, nor the same charisma and rhetoric skills 
as Chávez had to maintain chavismo in the Venezuelan domestic and foreign policy. 
Concluding, internationally Hugo Chávez raised great awareness for the hegemonic world order. 
His highly critical attitude towards the United States and neoliberalism might have been 
negative for global unification, but with this attitude he raised great awareness for neoliberal 
and capitalist hegemonic domination on an international level. Perhaps without his populist 
discourse, his ideas would not have had the attention they had achieved. This awareness had 
been important on an international level, to break the cycle of capitalist and Western hegemony. 
Oil abundance was good for bringing these ideas to a higher international level. However, if he 
would have done this with an open approach maintaining a dialogue, reciprocal understanding 
would have been better for global diplomacy. 
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